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Abstract
Modelling of hypothetical SARS-CoV-2 point-of-care
tests on admission to hospital from A&E:
rapid cost-effectiveness analysis
Matt Stevenson ,1* Andrew Metry 1 and Michael Messenger 2,3
1School of Health and Related Research (ScHARR), University of Sheffield, Sheffield, UK
2Leeds Institute of Health Sciences, University of Leeds, Leeds, UK
3NIHR Leeds Medtech and In Vitro Diagnostics Co-operative, Leeds, UK
*Corresponding author m.d.stevenson@sheffield.ac.uk
Background: Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) is the virus that causes
coronavirus disease 2019. At the time of writing (October 2020), the number of cases of COVID-19
had been approaching 38 million and more than 1 million deaths were attributable to it. SARS-CoV-2
appears to be highly transmissible and could rapidly spread in hospital wards.
Objective: The work undertaken aimed to estimate the clinical effectiveness and cost-effectiveness
of viral detection point-of-care tests for detecting SARS-CoV-2 compared with laboratory-based tests.
A further objective was to assess occupancy levels in hospital areas, such as waiting bays, before
allocation to an appropriate bay.
Perspective/setting: The perspective was that of the UK NHS in 2020. The setting was a hypothetical
hospital with an accident and emergency department.
Methods: An individual patient model was constructed that simulated the spread of disease and
mortality within the hospital and recorded occupancy levels. Thirty-two strategies involving different
hypothetical SARS-CoV-2 tests were modelled. Recently published desirable and acceptable target
product profiles for SARS-CoV-2 point-of-care tests were modelled. Incremental analyses were
undertaken using both incremental cost-effectiveness ratios and net monetary benefits, and key patient
outcomes, such as death and intensive care unit care, caused directly by COVID-19 were recorded.
Results: A SARS-CoV-2 point-of-care test with a desirable target product profile appears to have a
relatively small number of infections, a low occupancy level within the waiting bays, and a high net
monetary benefit. However, if hospital laboratory testing can produce results in 6 hours, then the
benefits of point-of-care tests may be reduced. The acceptable target product profiles performed less
well and had lower net monetary benefits than both a laboratory-based test with a 24-hour turnaround
time and strategies using data from currently available SARS-CoV-2 point-of-care tests. The desirable and
acceptable point-of-care test target product profiles had lower requirement for patients to be in waiting
bays before being allocated to an appropriate bay than laboratory-based tests, which may be of high
importance in some hospitals. Tests that appeared more cost-effective also had better patient outcomes.
Limitations: There is considerable uncertainty in the values for key parameters within the model,
although calibration was undertaken in an attempt to mitigate this. The example hospital simulated will
also not match those of decision-makers deciding on the clinical effectiveness and cost-effectiveness
of introducing SARS-CoV-2 point-of-care tests. Given these limitations, the results should be taken as
indicative rather than definitive, particularly cost-effectiveness results when the relative cost per
SARS-CoV-2 point-of-care test is uncertain.
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Conclusions: Should a SARS-CoV-2 point-of-care test with a desirable target product profile become
available, this appears promising, particularly when the reduction on the requirements for waiting bays
before allocation to a SARS-CoV-2-infected bay, or a non-SARS-CoV-2-infected bay, is considered. The
results produced should be informative to decision-makers who can identify the results most pertinent
to their specific circumstances.
Future work: More accurate results could be obtained when there is more certainty on the diagnostic
accuracy of, and the reduction in time to test result associated with, SARS-CoV-2 point-of-care tests,
and on the impact of these tests on occupancy of waiting bays and isolation bays. These parameters
are currently uncertain.
Funding: This report was commissioned by the National Institute for Health Research (NIHR) Evidence
Synthesis programme as project number 132154. This project was funded by the NIHR Health Technology
Assessment programme and will be published in full in Health Technology Assessment; Vol. 25, No. 21.
See the NIHR Journals Library website for further project information.
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Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) is the virus that causes coronavirusdisease 2019 (COVID-19). SARS-CoV-2 is highly infectious, and this can cause problems in hospitals,
where the virus can spread quickly. Laboratory-based tests can determine whether or not a patient has
SARS-CoV-2, but these tests are not perfect and can require a considerable time to provide a result.
Point-of-care tests to detect SARS-CoV-2 are being developed that may have much shorter times to
a test result, although these are likely to be less accurate than laboratory-based tests. The benefit of
quicker tests is that a decision to put a patient in a SARS-CoV-2-infected bay or in a non-SARS-CoV-
2-infected bay can be made sooner, limiting contact between patients with SARS-CoV-2 and patients
without SARS-CoV-2 and reducing the risk of infection transmission. The disadvantage of reduced accuracy
is that some patients may be allocated to the wrong bay, increasing the risk of SARS-CoV-2 infection.
A computer model was built to explore the impact of using SARS-CoV-2 point-of-care tests for people
admitted to hospital. This model estimated the number of infections and deaths due to COVID-19,
the costs of testing, and the number of people waiting to be put in an appropriate bay. Strategies
were run using different values, including the time to get a test result, the accuracy of tests and
whether or not staff who do not have symptoms should be tested. The results of the model indicated
that point-of-care tests could be good if there was a large reduction in the time to get a test result and
if accuracy was high. However, it is not certain whether or not such tests will become available. When
newer SARS-CoV-2 tests are available, the model will allow an estimate of the clinical effectiveness and
cost-effectiveness of the test to be made.
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Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), which was identified in China in 2019,
is the virus that causes coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19). At the time of writing (October 2020),
the number of cases of COVID-19 had been approaching 38 million and more than 1 million deaths
were attributable to it. SARS-CoV-2 appears to be highly transmissible and is spread primarily through
secretions from the nose or mouth, which can occur when coughing, sneezing or talking.
The risks of infection in hospital are high and, if possible, cohorting patients into bays within hospital
by those with SARS-CoV-2 infection and those without SARS-CoV-2 infection could reduce the number
of infections in hospital. However, current laboratory-based SARS-CoV-2 tests can take a considerable
time to produce a result, during which patients are often grouped by the presence or absence of clinical
symptoms suggestive of COVID-19, although this can be a poor predictor of SARS-CoV-2 infection,
as the symptoms of other respiratory illnesses can resemble those of COVID-19.
Currently, laboratory-based testing is relied on for detecting infections; however, considerable turnaround
time is required to receive a test result. Target product profiles for point-of-care tests for SARS-CoV-2
have been released by the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency that have a much
quicker turnaround time to receive a test result than laboratory-based testing, albeit with lower diagnostic
accuracy. Desirable and acceptable target product profiles were released; the clinical effectiveness and
cost-effectiveness of these target product profiles are unknown.
Objective
The objective of this study is to evaluate the expected clinical effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of
hypothetical point-of-care tests for SARS-CoV-2 when these are introduced into a hospital setting to
test patients admitted to hospital and to evaluate different strategies related to the use of SARS-CoV-2
point-of-care tests and laboratory-based SARS-CoV-2 tests.
Methods
As the tests were hypothetical, no systematic reviews of diagnostic accuracy were undertaken.
As the research was conducted to demanding deadlines, in agreement with the National Institute for
Health and Care Excellence, no systematic reviews were performed. Instead, published literature was
scanned and discussions with clinical experts were undertaken to identify literature sources to be used
in the modelling. New evidence was being published continually and this would not have been picked
up using standard systematic review techniques.
A mathematical model was constructed using an individual patient simulation methodology to allow
for interactions (and the possible spread of infection) between patients, from patients to staff,
from staff to patients and between staff. The model was populated from data identified in the
non-systematic review. Outputs from a mathematical model included the number of infections after
admission to hospital, the costs of testing patients and, where applicable, staff, and the occupancy
levels of waiting bays before a decision was made to move a patient to a SARS-CoV-2-infected bay
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or a non-SARS-CoV-2-infected bay. Thirty strategies using SARS-CoV-2 tests were initially modelled,
with additional scenario analyses undertaken in two groups of strategies, one that incorporated the
weekly testing of asymptomatic staff and one that did not. Additional strategies that evaluated the
impact on model results if SARS-CoV-2 testing were not possible were run. Calibration techniques
were used to ensure that the number of secondary infections associated with using the assumed
strategy in place at the start of the COVID-19 pandemic was in line with published evidence. For
SARS-CoV-2 point-of-care tests, the target product profiles were evaluated, as was a strategy using
data from real-world point-of-care tests for SARS-CoV-2.
Owing to the large number of strategies evaluated and the potential that incremental cost-effectiveness
ratios may provide misleading results when there are very small absolute differences in terms of costs
and health benefits, a net monetary benefit approach was adopted, although full incremental analyses
were also presented. Strategies were evaluated changing the assumed time to SARS-CoV-2 test results
and laboratory-based SARS-CoV-2 tests and the assumed diagnostic accuracy.
Results
Strategies with shorter times to test results were more cost-effective, all other things being equal, as
were SARS-CoV-2 tests with greater diagnostic accuracy. If a point-of-care test with the characteristics
of the desirable target product profile were available, then this would have a high net monetary benefit
and also would reduce the occupancy levels in waiting bays. The acceptable target product profile may
be seen to be too stringent in terms of turnaround time at the expense of diagnostic accuracy, as using
data from currently available SARS-CoV-2 point-of-care tests, which have a longer turnaround time but
better diagnostic accuracy, consistently produced higher values of net monetary benefit. The value of
testing asymptomatic staff may be dependent on the willingness-to-pay threshold per quality-adjusted
life-year. As anticipated, the use of no SARS-CoV-2 testing produced the greatest number of infections
but had the lowest costs associated with testing.
Discussion
There was considerable uncertainty relating to parameters within the model, although this was mitigated
to some degree by the calibration undertaken. However, the results produced should be taken not as
definitive, but as indicative only, with small levels of Monte Carlo sampling error remaining. It is not certain
the extent to which SARS-CoV-2 point-of-care tests would reduce the test turnaround time, nor is it
clear what the diagnostic accuracy of these tests would be, and thus the results remain hypothetical.
It is commented that both factors are important drivers of the clinical effectiveness and cost-effectiveness
of SARS-CoV-2 point-of-care tests. The relative cost of point-of-care tests to laboratory-based tests
can also influence cost-effectiveness. However, a structure is in place to evaluate new SARS-CoV-2
point-of-care tests as these become available.
Conclusions
Given the heterogeneity of hospitals, no blanket solution can be provided. This report contains
information that should be useful for decision-makers in assessing their own specific problem.
The modelling structure developed is anticipated to be useful to assess the cost-effectiveness of
SARS-CoV-2 point-of-care tests as further information on the costs, turnaround times and diagnostic
accuracy of these tests becomes known.
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Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) is the virus that causes coronavirusdisease 2019 (COVID-19), which was identified in China in 2019. At the time of writing (October 2020),
the number of cases of COVID-19 had been approaching 38 million and more than 1 million deaths
had been attributed to it.1 Based on the reported number of cases, SARS-CoV-2 appears to be highly
transmissible and is spread primarily through secretions from the nose or mouth, which can occur when
coughing, sneezing or talking.
The National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) scope2 details the exploratory economic
modelling of SARS-CoV-2 viral detection point-of-care tests (POCTs) and serology tests that is to be
undertaken. The scope covers a number of use cases, including hospitals, care homes, prisons and
general practice, and also includes the use of both viral detection POCTs and serology tests. With
the agreement of NICE, this report covers only a small portion of the scope, namely the clinical
effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of the use of viral detection POCTs in the treatment pathway
for patients who present at an accident and emergency (A&E) department. This also includes repeat
testing, where appropriate, and the testing of staff employed in the hospital. Future work will focus
on some of the remaining areas in the scope. Aside from focusing on patients presenting to an A&E
department, the work performed did not vary from that described in the original protocol.
The potential benefit of SARS-CoV-2 POCTs for patients admitted to hospital will be, primarily, the
time taken to obtain the test result. A shorter time will allow a decision to be made more quickly about
whether a patient should be allocated to a SARS-CoV-2-infected bay or to a non-SARS-CoV-2-infected
bay, reducing the expected level of infections prior to bay allocation, when people with and people
without SARS-CoV-2 infection potentially mix. The perspective taken was that of the NHS, with prices
in Great British pounds at 2020 values. The results presented provide an exploratory evaluation of the
clinical effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of hypothetical SARS-CoV-2 POCTs compared with current
laboratory-based SARS-CoV-2 tests.
This work is atypical of a standard diagnostic assessment report (DAR) for NICE for the following
reasons. First, the SARS-CoV-2 POCTs being evaluated are hypothetical and, thus, there may be no
results relevant to marketed tests. Second, as discussed, there is the fragmentation of the scope, which
will result in multiple reports. Third, and linked to the second point, the time allocated for this DAR
has been reduced markedly because of the importance of the topic, with the NICE Diagnostic Advisory
Committee meeting occurring 2 months earlier than originally planned. Fourth, the software package
used in this DAR, Simul8 (Simul8 Corporation, Glasgow, UK), is not one of NICE’s standard packages,
but NICE consented to its use, given the complexity of the decision problem and the reduced timelines;
the External Assessment Group (EAG) requested this package owing to its speed in constructing,
debugging and running complex individual patient models and the EAG’s familiarity with it. Fifth, owing
to the reduced timelines, it was agreed with NICE in the protocol2 that there would be no systematic
review related to the diagnostic accuracy of the performance of the tests. It was further anticipated
that the EAG would not ‘undertake systematic literature reviews for model parameters but will instead
use publicly available data from bodies such as Public Health England (PHE), request confidential data
from bodies such as PHE or rely on expert advice to populate the model’.2 The protocol also states that
the EAG ‘will try to keep abreast of newly published evidence relating to SARS-CoV-2/COVID-19 and
anticipates that where NICE or the specialist committee members recruited to the Diagnostic Advisory
Committee become aware of potentially relevant research that this would be signalled to the EAG’.2
(reproduced with permission from © NICE 2020 Exploratory Economic Modelling of SARS-CoV-2 Viral
Detection Point of Care Tests and Serology Tests. Available from www.nice.org.uk/guidance/indevelopment/
gid-dg10038/documents All rights reserved. Subject to Notice of rights. NICE guidance is prepared for the
National Health Service in England. All NICE guidance is subject to regular review and may be updated or
withdrawn. NICE accepts no responsibility for the use of its content in this product/publication.)
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Finally, given the complexity of the model, and the uncertainty around key variables in the model,
the results produced should be taken as indicative rather than definitive to a greater extent than
results from other DARs.
There is an inevitable trade-off between the model’s complexity, construction time and running time.
Simplifications have been made so that results can be generated more quickly. In discussion with NICE,
it was agreed that this model would focus on patients presenting to A&E, either through their own
volition or as a result of referral from their general practitioner.
The EAG stresses that the work undertaken is based largely on target product profiles (TPPs) issued
by the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency (MHRA).3 There is no certainty that
SARS-CoV-2 POCTs can meet the criteria for turnaround times in hospitals. If the time required to
process SARS-CoV-2 POCT results is lengthy, then the results in this report relating to SARS-CoV-2
POCTs may be redundant.
This work was discussed at a NICE Diagnostic Advisory Committee meeting. The process for such
appraisals includes patient and public involvement representatives who are involved in the making of
recommendations and present slides to comment on issues related to patient and public involvement.
Therefore, no patient and public involvement was sought by the EAG, which was to respond to any
issue raised during the committee’s deliberations. No such issues were explicitly raised to the EAG.
INTRODUCTION
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Chapter 2 Estimating the clinical effectiveness
and cost-effectiveness of SARS-CoV-2 viral
detection point-of-care tests and serology tests
The conceptual model: patients
The EAG spoke with many of the NICE specialist committee members (SCMs) for this topic and
colleagues of the SCMs to validate the proposed conceptual model and to highlight potential sources
of data that could populate the model. It was clear that hospitals had heterogeneous pathways in
place; accordingly, the model has been structured to allow an exploration of the clinical effectiveness
and cost-effectiveness of SARS-CoV-2 tests using different underlying assumptions.
A simplified schematic of the hospital pathway for people arriving at an A&E department is shown in
Figure 1. The use of SARS-CoV-2 testing, in particular the differences between POCTs and laboratory-
based tests, is not shown in this diagram but will be discussed in this chapter.
Each model run curtails patients entering the model after 90 days (3 months). In the base case, this is
associated with simulating 22,500 patients attending A&E (see Interarrival times and time required to
make a decision on whether or not hospital admission is needed). Each patient who entered the model would
have their full experience simulated; thus, a patient entering in month 3 who required a 2-month hospital
admission would not leave the model until month 5. The 3-month duration is arbitrary, although any
(non-infinite) time point would not allow consideration of the full pathway of all potential infections.
However, 3 months was believed to be a reasonable period during which indicative results would be
useful and was assumed to cover the winter months of 2020/21, when the rate of hospital admissions
would be highest. To allow for patient care that could last a considerable time (see Length of stay in the



















FIGURE 1 A simplified schematic of the hospital pathway for people arriving at A&E. ICU, intensive care unit.
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Scenario analyses will be conducted to show the impact of factors such as greater (or smaller) numbers
of patients arriving and a higher (or lower) prevalence of SARS-CoV-2 infection. It is assumed that the
model starts cold, in that no patients are assumed to be in the hospital at the start of the model. This is
a simplification but was not assumed to affect the indicative comparative results between different
strategies related to the use of SARS-CoV-2 tests.
As the consequences of a patient contracting COVID-19 can be severe, the modelling assumes a lifetime
perspective. Discounting is undertaken at a rate of 3.5% per annum for health as recommended by NICE;4
costs were considered for the initial year only and have not been discounted.
Detailing the elements of Figure 1
Each sub-section discusses the assumptions and data sources associated with each element of Figure 1.
Attendance at accident and emergency department
This element simulates the arrival of a patient at hospital. The next step is dependent on the SARS-CoV-2
testing strategy that is in place, as the model has the functionality to explore testing all patients who
attend A&E or testing only those patients who are to be admitted to hospital.
If the strategy of testing all patients who attend A&E is selected, then the patient would have a
SARS-CoV-2 test performed (see Testing strategies for patients arriving at accident and emergency) before
moving to ‘waiting for a decision on admission’. When tests are performed only on those admitted to
hospital, the person moves directly to ‘waiting for a decision on admission’. For this report, only results
for when testing is used for those admitted to hospital are presented.
Waiting for a decision on admission
This element simulates the period during which a patient is waiting in a hospital to see a clinician who
will make a definitive decision about whether or not the patient requires hospital admission. The time
required for this decision is not modelled explicitly based on the number of patients and number of
staff but uses estimated times that differ by time of day. Further details are provided in Interarrival
times and time required to make a decision on whether or not hospital admission is needed.
During this period, the person could possibly be infected by another person with SARS-CoV-2 who
is waiting for a decision about hospital admission, or this person, if infected with SARS-CoV-2, could
potentially infect other people who do not currently have SARS-CoV-2. Further details are provided
in Simulation of the spread of SARS-CoV-2 infection.
Following the definitive clinical decision, patients who do not need to be admitted are discharged.
Those who require hospital admission receive a SARS-CoV-2 test, if they did not receive this test on
arrival at A&E, and are moved to the ‘waiting for a decision on bed allocation’ element. It is assumed
that all patients can be accommodated within the ‘waiting for a decision on bed allocation’ area
(see The configuration of the hospitals used in the example).
Waiting for a decision on bed allocation
This element is divided into two sub-elements: those who have symptoms indicative of potential COVID-19
infection and those who do not. Currently, the EAG has heard that hospitals will try to separate patients
into these groups while a SARS-CoV-2 test is performed to aid the decision about allocating the patient to a
designated SARS-CoV-2-infected bay or to a designated non-SARS-CoV-2-infected bay to reduce the risk of
spreading or contracting infection while in hospital. Hence, if a patient receives a test more quickly, then this
is manifested in a shorter time waiting for a decision about the appropriate bed and less capacity pressure
on the waiting bays. It is assumed that all patients can be accommodated in the SARS-CoV-2-infected bays
and the non-SARS-CoV-2-infected bays (see The configuration of the hospitals used in the example).
ESTIMATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE TESTS
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In the base-case model, all patients who have clinical symptoms suggestive of COVID-19 would have a
second test if their initial test result was negative, in case that result was a false negative. The allocation
of the patient would be made on the basis of the second SARS-CoV-2 test unless the patient had chest
imaging results indicative of COVID-19, in which case both tests would be over-ridden and the patient
would be sent to a SARS-CoV-2-infected bay. The model has the functionality to alter the proportion of
instances in which two negative tests were over-ridden. Sensitivity analyses have been undertaken
assuming that the proportion of patients over-ridden was zero.
Patients who have clinical symptoms suggestive of COVID-19 and a positive SARS-CoV-2 test are
moved to a SARS-CoV-2-infected bay. Patients without clinical symptoms have only one test, with a
positive SARS-CoV-2 test resulting in them being placed in a SARS-CoV-2-infected bay and a negative
SARS-CoV-2 test resulting in the them being placed in a non-SARS-CoV-2-infected bay.
For all patients there is a possibility that the SARS-CoV-2 test fails. In this instance the patient remains
in the waiting bay while the test is reconducted. The probability of SARS-CoV-2 test failure is detailed
in Characteristics of the point-of-care tests and laboratory-based tests.
The model has the functionality to alter the base case with these amendments explored in scenario
analyses. Exceptions to allocating based purely on the base-case model are:
1. Allocation of a patient to an intermediate bay (henceforth labelled a ‘pink bay’). Where the hospital
has sufficient capacity, pink bays may be created for patients who have no clinical symptoms of
COVID-19 and no evidence from chest imaging that would indicate SARS-CoV-2 infection. In this
instance a clinician may suspect that the test was a false positive and not wish to confine the
patient to a SARS-CoV-2-infected bay. When pink bays were used, a new tranche of staff working in
pink bays was activated.
2. Allowing patients with clinical symptoms of COVID-19 and two negative SARS-CoV-2 tests to remain
in a waiting bay until discharge, transfer to the intensive care unit (ICU) or death. This option is
explored in scenario analyses and may be feasible for only some hospitals.
3. Removing the requirement to retest patients who have clinical symptoms suggestive of COVID-19
but a negative SARS-CoV-2 test result. In this scenario, people with a negative SARS-CoV-2 test
result and no symptoms of COVID-19 on chest imaging would be allocated to a non-SARS-CoV-2-
infected bay. Those with chest imaging indicative of COVID-19 would have their destination
(SARS-CoV-2-infected bay or non-SARS-CoV-2-infected bay) chosen depending on the assumption
used for over-riding the SARS-CoV-2 test.
The configuration of the bays in the area reserved for patients who require hospital admission and are
waiting for the result of a SARS-CoV-2 test is user-definable. The assumptions used in the modelling
are discussed in The configuration of the hospitals used in the example.
Allocated to an appropriate bed in a SARS-CoV-2-infected bay or a non-SARS-CoV-2-infected bay
As detailed in Waiting for a decision on bed allocation, for a patient admitted to hospital there are a
number of options regarding the allocated bed.
Scenario analyses expand the choices of destination by allowing the patient to move to a pink bay
(see Waiting for a decision on bed allocation) or to remain in the waiting bay until discharge or until ICU
care is required (see Retesting strategies for patients admitted to hospital).
Based on the patient’s characteristics, he or she is assumed to leave the SARS-CoV-2-infected bay or
non-SARS-CoV-2-infected bay by one of three routes: to discharge, following recovery; to the ICU,
following a worsening of the condition; or as a result of death while in the bay. The probability of these
three options, and the length of stay before leaving the bay, is discussed in Simulation of the spread of
SARS-CoV-2 infection.
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When the general bay (SARS-CoV-2-infected or non-SARS-CoV-2-infected) has been determined,
patients can infect, and by infected by, other patients in the bay and by staff employed in that bay.
Staff attend patients in more than one bay and, thus, it is possible for staff to pass infection between
bays. See Simulation of the spread of SARS-CoV-2 infection for more details.
Patients in non-SARS-CoV-2-infected bays can develop clinical symptoms of COVID-19 if they have
been infected while in hospital (see Simulation of the spread of SARS-CoV-2 infection) and can also have a
positive SARS-CoV-2 test when they are routinely tested in hospital (see Retesting strategies for patients
admitted to hospital). In both instances, the patient would be moved to a SARS-CoV-2-infected bay.
The model assumes that clinical symptoms develop only following SARS-CoV-2 infection and not as a
result of other diseases such as pneumonia.
Admission to intensive care unit
The ICU is subdivided into ICU bays reserved for those who are suspected of having SARS-CoV-2
infection, or have a positive SARS-CoV-2 test, and ICU bays for the remaining patients. Typically, this
will be decided depending on whether or not the patient had been in a bay for patients with SARS-
CoV-2 infection immediately before their admission to ICU. An exception to this would be a patient
requiring ICU care who had been in a non-SARS-CoV-2-infected bay in which another patient had
developed clinical symptoms suggestive of COVID-19 or had a positive SARS-CoV-2 test during routine
retesting. This patient would go to a SARS-CoV-2-infected ICU bay, rather than to a non-SARS-CoV-2-
infected ICU bay.
Patients in non-SARS-CoV-2-infected ICU bays can develop clinical symptoms of COVID-19 if they
have been infected while in hospital and can also have a positive SARS-CoV-2 test when routinely
tested in hospital (see Retesting strategies for patients admitted to hospital) as a result of infection in
hospital, a false-negative result to testing on admission to hospital or a false-positive result on the
repeat test. In both of these instances the patient would be moved to a SARS-CoV-2-infected ICU bay.
Once admitted to ICU, the patient can leave in one of two ways: recovery and removal to a non-ICU
bay, conditional on whether or not the patient had previously been allocated to a SARS-CoV-2-infected
bay; or death. The probability of these events happening is based on the patient’s characteristics and is
detailed in The characteristics of patients attending accident and emergency. For simplicity, patients who
are moved from the ICU to a general bay on their recovery are assumed to no longer be infectious with
SARS-CoV-2 because of the likely number of days since clinical onset, although these patients would still
be assumed to be grouped in SARS-CoV-2-infected bays. It is assumed that patients cannot be reinfected
during the same hospital stay and will be discharged following a period in the general bay.
During a patient’s stay in the ICU, they can infect, and be infected by, other patients in the ICU bay
and by staff employed in that ICU bay.
The configurations of SARS-CoV-2-infected ICU bays and of non-SARS-CoV-2-infected ICU bays are
user-definable. The assumptions used in the modelling are discussed in The configuration of the hospitals
used in the example.
The model does not currently have the facility to allow patients to enter the ICU directly.
Discharge
Patients can be discharged from either A&E or a general bay. The earliest point of discharge is after
medical assessment of whether or not the patient requires hospital admission (see Waiting for a decision
on admission). If this patient has a SARS-CoV-2 test, then they will be informed of the result on
discharge if this is known, or at a later date otherwise. Patients can also be discharged from a general
bay if they do not require ICU care. Those patients who have received ICU care will be transferred as
detailed in Allocated to an appropriate bed in a SARS-CoV-2-infected bay or a non-SARS-CoV-2-infected bay.
ESTIMATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE TESTS
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In a scenario analysis in which patients who have clinical symptoms suggestive of COVID-19 but have
two negative tests are kept in waiting bays, discharge can occur from the waiting bay (see Retesting
strategies for patients admitted to hospital).
There is the possibility that, on discharge, the patient could infect a member of staff or be infected by
a member of staff. Further details on this are provided in Effective contacts and attack rates.
Death in hospital
Patients can die in the hospital. This is detailed in The mortality rates for patients admitted to hospital.
The conceptual model: staff
The staff in the model have been grouped into 10 categories related to distinct areas through which
patients can progress. These staff are those involved in:
l deciding whether or not a patient requires admission to hospital
l performing the SARS-CoV-2 test
l attending patients in suspected SARS-CoV-2-infected waiting bays
l attending patients in non-suspected SARS-CoV-2-infected waiting bays
l attending patients in SARS-CoV-2-infected bays
l attending patients in non-SARS-CoV-2-infected bays
l attending patients in SARS-CoV-2-infected ICU bays
l attending patients in non-SARS-CoV-2-infected ICU bays
l discharging a patient
l attending patients in pink bays (in scenario analyses).
To simplify the model, these groups include all staff members involved in that work, such as doctors,
nurses, allied health staff, cleaners and receptionists.
Staff contact with patients and the risks of infection are detailed in Effective contacts and attack rates.
The risks of staff being infected with SARS-CoV-2 outside the hospital are detailed in The characteristics
of staff members working in the hospital. Strategies assumed for testing staff are detailed in Testing
strategies for asymptomatic staff.
Population of the model
Each subsection discusses the assumptions and data sources associated with populating the model.
The characteristics of patients attending accident and emergency
Categorisation of patients by SARS-CoV-2 infection status and need for hospitalisation
Patients have been grouped into four categories depending on their SARS-CoV-2 infection status and
whether or not they require hospitalisation.
The proportion of patients attending A&E who are infected with SARS-CoV-2 (both symptomatic and
asymptomatic) has been estimated to be 5.3%, based on Feng et al.,5 which is reasonably in line with
estimations from clinical experts. The proportion of patients with SARS-CoV-2 infection who require
hospitalisation was assumed to be two-thirds, based on the approximate weighted average for male
and female patients with suspected COVID-19 reported by Goodacre et al.6
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Among the patients attending A&E without SARS-CoV-2 infection, it was assumed that 18.7% would
require hospitalisation, based on data before SARS-CoV-2 was identified. This figure represents the
weighted average of 2017–18 data in NHS Digital’s summary report 14 (‘Percentage of attendances
admitted from A&E by month’).7 However, it has been reported that 32% of patients admitted to
hospital do not require an overnight stay.8 For simplicity, it has been assumed that these patients will
be discharged rather than admitted to hospital, given the circulation of SARS-CoV-2, resulting in an
admission rate among non-SARS-CoV-2-infected patients of 12.7%.
Given these proportions, the breakdown of patients arriving at A&E with SARS-CoV-2 infection
status and their requirement, or not, for hospital admission used in the base-case model are shown
in Table 1.
The prevalence of clinical symptoms indicative of COVID-19 in those patients
admitted to hospital
The probability that a patient admitted to hospital has clinical symptoms indicative of COVID-19 is
conditional on whether the patient has or has not been infected with SARS-CoV-2. For patients
hospitalised because of a SARS-CoV-2 infection, the proportion with clinical symptoms was set at
95.5% using the value reported by Docherty et al.9
We estimated the proportion of patients who have not been infected with SARS-CoV-2 but who
nevertheless have symptoms indicative of COVID-19 using data presented in Goodacre et al.6 and
Docherty et al.9 Goodacre et al.6 provide the number of patients admitted to hospital who are suspected
of having COVID-19 based on clinical assessment that noted that the diagnostic criteria for COVID-19
at the time the data were collected were fever (i.e. temperature of ≥ 37.8 °C) and presence of at least
one of a number of clinical conditions that had to be of acute onset: persistent cough (with or without
sputum), hoarseness, nasal discharge or congestion, shortness of breath, sore throat, wheezing or
sneezing. A total of 5768 patients had a positive SARS-CoV-2 test and 8229 patients had a negative
SARS-CoV-2 test or were not tested.
The proportion of patients who are hospitalised who do not have COVID-19 but have symptoms
indicative of COVID-19 is equal to:
A × B ÷C ÷D, (1)
where:
A is the proportion of total patients attending A&E who have COVID-19 and who will be hospitalised.
In the base case, this is 0.035, calculated as 0.053 (from Feng et al.5) × 2/3 (from Goodacre et al.6).
B is the proportion of patients with COVID-19 who are hospitalised and who have clinical symptoms of
COVID-19. In the base case, this is 95.5% from Docherty et al.9
TABLE 1 Characteristics of patients attending A&E conditional on




SARS-CoV-2 infected 3.53% 1.80%
Not SARS-CoV-2 infected 12.04% 82.63%
ESTIMATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE TESTS
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C is the ratio of the number of patients with clinical symptoms indicative of COVID-19 who have COVID-19
to the number of patients with clinical symptoms indicative of COVID-19 who do not have COVID-19.
Goodacre et al. report a value of 0.70 (5768/8339).6 However, the data presented in Goodacre et al.6 assume
that patients who are not tested do not have COVID-19 and could also potentially include false-negative
tests. Thus, the ratio of admitted patients with clinical symptoms who have COVID-19 to admitted patients
with clinical symptoms who do not have COVID-19 is likely to be underestimated. In the base case we have
used a ratio of COVID-19 to non-COVID-19 for those with symptoms suggestive of COVID-19 of 1.
D is the proportion of the total patients attending A&E who do not have COVID-19 and who will
be hospitalised. In the base case this is 0.120, calculated as 1 – 0.053 (from Feng et al.5) × 0.12777
(data adjusted for non-overnight stays).
Following these calculations for patients admitted to hospital, it was estimated that 28.02% of patients
admitted to hospital would have symptoms suggestive of COVID-19 but would not have COVID-19.
However, it is likely that in the winter months the proportion of patients with a respiratory illness would
increase and, thus, in the base-case model we have increased the proportion of patients admitted to
hospital without a SARS-CoV-2 infection but with symptoms suggestive of COVID-19 to 50%. We use
the 28.02% value in sensitivity analyses.
The breakdown of SARS-CoV-2 infection status and probability of clinical symptoms suggestive of
COVID-19 for patients admitted to hospital on entry to A&E is shown in Table 2. In both the base
case and the sensitivity analyses, 15.58% of people attending A&E are admitted to hospital. Of the
remaining 84.42% who are not admitted, an estimated 2.14% will have SARS-CoV-2 infection and have
the potential to infect those without SARS-CoV-2 infection while both are waiting for a decision to be
made on hospital admission.
The infectious status of patients with SARS-CoV-2 infection and time until the
patient is no longer infectious
It was assumed that all patients who arrived at A&E infected with SARS-CoV-2 had reached the
infectious period and could infect other people (both patients and staff) with whom they came into
contact. The time before these patients would no longer be infectious was estimated using data from
Clifford et al.,10 He et al.11 (see Times to becoming infectious, developing symptoms if symptomatic, and becoming
non-infectious for a patient infected with SARS-CoV-2 in hospital) and a systematic review by Jefferson et al.12
that indicated that a patient is unlikely to be infectious 8 days from the emergence of clinical symptoms.
As a simplification, we assumed that the time at which patients arriving at A&E infected with SARS-CoV-2
would no longer be infectious could be represented by a uniform distribution of 3–6 days. Near the
completion of the report, data from Singanayagam et al.13 were published that indicated a potentially
longer period of being infectious. The impact of using a longer period was explored in sensitivity analyses.
TABLE 2 Characteristics of patients who were admitted to hospital on
their entry to A&E
SARS-CoV-2 status




SARS-CoV-2 infected 21.66 1.02
Not SARS-CoV-2 infected 38.66 38.66
Sensitivity analyses
SARS-CoV-2 infected 21.66 1.02
Not SARS-CoV-2 infected 21.66 55.65
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The age and sex of patients attending accident and emergency who are admitted
to hospital
The age distributions of patients admitted to hospital with a SARS-CoV-2 infection were presented in
table 1 of Docherty et al.,9 conditional on sex, with the paper reporting that 59.9% of patients with
SARS-CoV-2 infection were male. More recent data were provided by International Severe Acute
Respiratory and emerging Infection Consortium Coronavirus Clinical Characterisation Consortium
(ISARIC4C) investigators (Lisa Norman, Centre for Medical Informatics, University of Edinburgh, 2020,
personal communication). These distributions of age by sex are reported in Table 3. For patients with
clinical symptoms indicative of COVID-19, we assumed the same distribution as for patients with a
SARS-CoV-2 infection, as data from Goodacre et al.6 (table 6 of that paper) showed values for patients
with a SARS-CoV-2 positive test similar to those for patients who either had a negative SARS-CoV-2
test or were not tested.
The age distributions of patients who required hospitalisation but had neither a SARS-CoV-2 infection
nor clinical symptoms indicative of COVID-19 were taken from NHS admissions data for 2015–16.14
These distributions are shown in Table 3. Data on patients needing hospitalisation for reasons other
than COVID-19 were not separated by sex; in consultation with SCMs, it was decided that using the
same proportion for male and female patients was a reasonable assumption.
Age distributions for patients not hospitalised were not required as the model does not explicitly take
into consideration the consequences of reinfection for patients discharged from A&E.
TABLE 3 Age distributions used in the model for patients requiring hospitalisation
Age (years)
Patients requiring hospitalisation
with at least one of SARS-CoV-2
infection and symptoms indicative
of COVID-19 (%)
Patients requiring hospitalisation
with neither SARS-CoV-2 infection
nor symptoms indicative of
COVID-19a (%)
Male Female Male and female
< 15 1.0 0.9 12.1
15–19 0.3 0.4 2.4
20–24 0.6 0.9 4.2
25–29 0.8 1.7 5.4
30–34 1.3 2.1 5.6
35–39 2.0 2.1 4.6
40–44 2.9 2.4 4.3
45–49 4.3 3.6 5.2
50–54 6.0 4.9 5.9
55–59 7.4 5.7 6.4
60–64 7.9 6.3 6.6
65–69 8.5 6.7 8.3
70–74 11.1 9.2 7.9
75–79 12.6 11.4 7.6
80–84 14.0 14.1 6.4
85–89 11.8 14.6 4.4
≥ 90 7.4 13.0 2.6
All ages 100 100 100
a Data were not available stratified by sex and hence an equal split was assumed.
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The requirement for intensive care unit care among patients admitted to hospital
The proportions of patients with SARS-CoV-2 infection admitted to hospital who need ICU care by
age band were provided by ISARIC4C investigators (Lisa Norman, personal communication). These data
are shown in Table 4.
The proportion of patients without SARS-CoV-2 infection who need ICU care was estimated, having
first estimated the number of patients admitted via A&E and then estimated the number of patients
going to the ICU from A&E admission.
The numbers of patients admitted via A&E were taken from a House of Commons Library briefing paper15
and the number of total finished admission episodes was taken from supplementary information of NHS
Digital’s ‘Hospital admitted patient care activity 2015-16’ report.14 It was assumed that the proportion
of total patients admitted who were admitted via A&E (26.4%) could be applied to each age band for
patients admitted via A&E to calculate the number of admissions from A&E for each age band.
The age distribution of total ICU admissions in 2016 was extracted from Intensive Care National Audit
and Research Centre data.16 An assumption was made that patients admitted from A&E who require
ICU care would follow this distribution. The proportions by age band were then multiplied by the total
number of admissions from A&E requiring ICU care16 to estimate the number of ICU admissions from
A&E by age band. The proportion of patients without SARS-CoV-2 infection was then estimated by
dividing the number of patients admitted to hospital via A&E by age band by the number of patients
admitted via A&E who require ICU care. The proportions are shown in Table 4. All data were prior to
the identification of SARS-CoV-2.
TABLE 4 The proportion of admitted patients who require ICU care by SARS-CoV-2 status
Age (years)
Patients with SARS-CoV-2
infection requiring ICU care (%)
Patients without SARS-CoV-2
infection requiring ICU care (%)
















≥ 90 3.9 1.2
All ages 100 100
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The mortality rates for patients admitted to hospital
The proportions of patients with SARS-CoV-2 infection admitted to hospital who died were provided
by ISARIC4C investigators (Lisa Norman, personal communication). These data are shown in Table 5
using the assumption that the mortality rate among patients receiving ongoing care was the same as
the mortality rate among those who had reached a final outcome (being discharged or having died).
The data were divided into the proportion of patients who die without ICU care and the proportion
of patients who die in the ICU.
The proportion of patients without SARS-CoV-2 infection who died was estimated from Meacock et al.,17
who indicated a mortality rate across all patients of 3.5% following admission from A&E. The age profile
of patients admitted to hospital without SARS-CoV-2 infection (see Table 4) was multiplied by the ratio
of non-ICU deaths for patients with SARS-CoV-2 infection, assuming that this was generalisable to
patients without SARS-CoV-2 infection and using a multiplication factor such that the estimated
proportion of patients dying was approximately 3.5%. The estimated data for mortality among patients
admitted to hospital without SARS-CoV-2 infection are shown in Table 5.
It is assumed that, owing to the critical condition of patients requiring ICU care, the proportion of
patients dying in ICU without SARS-CoV-2 infection was the same as that of those with SARS-CoV-2
infection. This may underestimate the probability of death for patients who require ICU care and are
also infected with SARS-CoV-2.
TABLE 5 The proportion of admitted patients who die in hospital by SARS-CoV-2 status and by location
Age (years)
Patients with SARS-CoV-2 infection (%) Patients without SARS-CoV-2 infection (%)
Non-ICU ICU Non-ICU ICU
Male Female Both sexes Both sexes Both sexes
< 15 0.6 0.0 7.1 0.1 7.1
15–19 3.7 1.2 3.6 0.5 3.6
20–24 2.0 0.0 8.3 0.2 8.3
25–29 3.0 0.4 10.2 0.3 10.2
30–34 1.4 0.5 16.7 0.2 16.7
35–39 2.4 1.1 16.1 0.4 16.1
40–44 2.9 1.8 20.3 0.5 20.3
45–49 3.5 1.5 23.2 0.5 23.2
50–54 5.6 3.5 29.2 1.0 29.2
55–59 9.8 2.6 37.7 1.2 37.7
60–64 13.8 9.9 47.3 2.7 47.3
65–69 20.0 17.2 51.9 4.3 51.9
70–74 31.2 23.1 61.9 6.2 61.9
75–79 40.1 32.8 65.2 8.5 65.2
80–84 48.5 39.6 71.7 10.2 71.7
85–89 55.3 42.1 62.1 11.2 62.1
≥ 90 61.6 47.2 56.0 12.5 56.0
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The outcomes associated with chest imaging
It is assumed that people with clinical symptoms suggestive of COVID-19 would receive chest imaging
to provide the clinician with information. For this report, as a simplification it is assumed that patients
without symptoms suggestive of COVID-19 do not receive chest imaging, although the model has the
functionality to incorporate chest imaging for those without clinical symptoms suggestive of COVID-19.
As described in Waiting for a decision on bed allocation, the model allows a negative SARS-CoV-2 test
result not to be acted on if the clinician has a strong belief, based on clinical symptoms and chest
imaging, that the result may be a false negative. The proportion of patients with clinical symptoms and
COVID-19 who were assumed to have chest imaging results suggestive of COVID-19 was 56% (taken
from Borakati et al.18). The proportion of patients with clinical symptoms but without COVID-19 who were
assumed to have chest imaging results suggestive of COVID-19 was 40% (taken from Borakati et al.18),
equating to a specificity of detecting COVID-19 of 60%. These values were for chest X-ray. In sensitivity
analyses, the values reported by Borakati et al.18 for computed tomography were used, which were a
sensitivity of detecting COVID-19 of 85% and a specificity of 50%. In this study, polymerase chain
reaction results were assumed to be the gold standard.
Immunity to SARS-CoV-2 infection
It has been hypothesised that some people may have immunity to SARS-CoV-2 infection, although this
theory is subject to much debate.19 In the base case it has been assumed that no person has immunity
to SARS-CoV-2 infection, unless they had SARS-CoV-2 infection when attending A&E or were infected
with SARS-CoV-2 during hospital admission. The model has the functionality to allow a proportion of
patients entering A&E without a current SARS-CoV-2 infection to be considered immune to infection.
Ethnicity and the prevalence of comorbidities
The model was constructed to provide functionality for other patient characteristics, such as the
prevalence of comorbidities and whether or not a patient is from an ethnic minority, as these are
believed to be correlated with poorer outcomes. However, this functionality has not been used as we
are using observed patient characteristics and outcomes and using additional weighting for death or
ICU requirement would result in an overinflation of poor outcomes.
The characteristics of staff members working in the hospital
At the start of the model, it is assumed that no staff members have been infected by SARS-CoV-2 and that
none exhibits clinical symptoms suggestive of COVID-19. The age distributions, ethnicity and comorbidity
status of staff members were not required as the model does not explicitly take into consideration the
consequences of infection for staff beyond infecting other staff members and patients.
To simplify the model, it was assumed that each area bullet-pointed in The conceptual model: staff used
20 staff. These staff members work across multiple bays in the distinct areas and so infection can be
passed between bays. Thus, staff members assigned to SARS-CoV-2 infection bays would not work in
non-SARS-CoV-2 infection bays or at discharge. Staff members were randomly chosen when contacting
patients and other staff members (as detailed in Effective contacts and attack rates).
It is assumed that staff members can be infected with SARS-CoV-2 outside the hospital setting.
The risk of this per day is assumed to be 0.6 per 10,000 people, based on data from the Office for
National Statistics.20
The configuration of the hospitals used in the example
The model has the functionality to assess different levels of patient attendance per day and different
numbers of bays. In this report we focus on an example of a large hospital. It is acknowledged that
these numbers will not reflect a specific hospital, but they are there, along with the sensitivity analysis,
to provide indicative results. For each of the waiting bays, the admitted bays, the ICU bays and the
waiting for decision on admission bays, the last bay is set to an infinite capacity to signify the use of
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non-designated areas when necessary or to take into account transfers to alternative hospitals or
facilities if required. The number of people in each infinite bay across time has been presented for
selected strategies.
The configuration of the example hospital is provided in Table 6. In sensitivity analyses, three four-bed
SARS-CoV-2-infected bays were removed and replaced with three four-bed pink bays and one infinite
pink bay.
The routing into all bays assumes that patients will fill the bays in numerical order, so if there were six
four-bed bays then the first four patients would be put in to the first bay, with the fifth patient being
allocated to the second bay, unless one of the patients in the first bay was no longer occupying a bed.
The EAG notes that if hospitals were prepared to open multiple bays and fill these sequentially, this
may reduce the number of infections.
Interarrival times and time required to make a decision on whether or not hospital
admission is needed
The model does not explicitly simulate the interaction between staff and patients to work out queueing
times. A simplified approach has been taken, whereby patients arrive at constant rates but the time
before a decision is made whether or not to admit the person is altered depending on the time of day to
simulate variable waiting times before the decision is made to admit to hospital or to discharge.
The number of people attending A&E per day was assumed to be 250 following discussion with clinical
experts. The waiting time before a decision to admit or not to admit was assumed depending on the
time of day the patient arrived, with the assumption that the 250 patients would be spaced equally
throughout the day. The time required for the admission decision was assumed to be 2 hours for
patients arriving between midnight and 6 a.m., 3 hours for patients arriving between 6 a.m. and
6 p.m. and 4 hours for patients arriving between 6 p.m. and midnight. For simplicity, it was assumed
that the time until the decision on admission was independent of the severity of a person’s injury.
Simulation of the spread of SARS-CoV-2 infection
The model simulates infections in the following four categories: patient to patient, patient to staff, staff
to patient and staff to staff. It has been assumed that infection can be passed only to patients and staff
who did not enter A&E with SARS-CoV-2 infection and have not been infected previously during the
hospital stay.
TABLE 6 The assumed configuration of the example hospital
Hospital area Allocated capacity
Waiting for a decision to admit to hospital or not 3 10-person areas and 1 infinite area
Waiting area after decision to admit to hospital for
patients with clinical symptoms suggestive of COVID-19
4 single-bed bays, 4 four-bed bays and 1 infinite bay
Waiting area after decision to admit to hospital for
patients without clinical symptoms suggestive of COVID-19
6 four-bed bays and 1 infinite bay
SARS-CoV-2-infected bays 10 four-bed bays and 1 infinite bay
Non-SARS-CoV-2-infected bays 17 four-bed bays and 1 infinite bay
SARS-CoV-2-infected ICU bays 6 four-bed bays and 1 infinite bay
Non-SARS-CoV-2-infected ICU bays 6 four-bed bays and 1 infinite bay
SARS-CoV-2-infected post-ICU bays 4 four-bed bays and 1 infinite bay
Non-SARS-CoV-2-infected ICU bays 4 four-bed bays and 1 infinite bay
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Effective contacts and attack rates
Key components of the spread of SARS-CoV-2 are effective contacts and attack rates, and the number
of subsequent transmissions within hospital bays from infectious patients or staff is correlated with
the product of these components. Patients and staff can become infected if they have one or more
‘effective contacts’ with someone infected with SARS-CoV-2, and the probability that the infection will
be passed during that contact is termed the ‘attack rate’. To decrease the running time of the model,
it was assumed that the simulation of infections with SARS-CoV-2 occurred only once per day. This has
the limitation that people who had died or were discharged would not contribute to the transmission
of SARS-CoV-2 infection, even though they spent some time in the hospital.
Evaluating the number of effective contacts is the number of people with whom an infectious person is
assumed to come into contact and could potentially infect during a stated time period, which in the
model is 1 day. As described in The conceptual model: staff, staff are grouped by discipline, with each
effective contact being assumed to be with a randomly selected member of the relevant pool. Potential
contacts between the remaining pairing of staff and patients are handled similarly; for example, in
the case of patient-to-patient contact, a contact would be made with a random patient in the same
bay/ICU bay. Therefore, patients allocated to a single-bed bay cannot directly infect other patients
while in this bay, although infection could occur indirectly via staff.
The model has been constructed so that if the number of effective contacts is greater than the number of
people who could be infected (e.g. the number of other patients in the bay/ICU bay), then it is assumed
that the patient had effective contact with all patients in that location. The model has the functionality for
the number of effective contacts to differ by (1) location (waiting for admission decision, testing, waiting
bay, general bay, ICU bay and discharge), (2) designation of location (suspected SARS-CoV-2-infected
bays, non-suspected SARS-CoV-2-infected bays or pink bays) and (3) the relevant pairings (patient to
patient, patient to staff, staff to patient and staff to staff).
Evaluating the number of effective contacts in non-bay areas (waiting for a decision to be made on
hospital admission, and at discharge and testing) uses a slightly different methodology, assessing
‘one-off’ contacts, rather than periodically assessing the contacts, as patients are not expected to spend
significant time in contact with other patients or staff. While waiting for a decision to be made about
admission to hospital, it is assumed that an infectious patient will make effective contact with a defined
number of patients already in the waiting area, or the number of people in the care area if smaller.
When being tested for SARS-CoV-2 or being discharged, the patient can make contact with a maximum
of one member of staff only.
Effective contacts can be a non-integer number. In this instance, the number is probabilistically
adjusted to an integer in each time period. For example, if the effective contact between a patient and
staff a member was assumed to be 0.8, then there would be an 80% chance of an effective contact
with one staff member and a 20% chance of zero effective contacts with staff.
Following an effective contact, the model determines whether or not the infection has been passed on
by using the attack rate. The model has the functionality for attack rates to differ by (1) location (waiting
for admission decision, testing, waiting bay, general bay, ICU bay and discharge); (2) designation of
location (suspected SARS-CoV-2-infected bays, non-suspected SARS-CoV-2-infected bays or pink bays);
(3) the relevant pairings (patient to patient, patient to staff, staff to patient and staff to staff); and
(4) whether or not the person with SARS-CoV-2 infection is symptomatic, as it has been reported that
asymptomatic patients have a lower chance of passing on infection than symptomatic patients.
The attack rate lies between 0 and 1, this value being the probability that a patient has become
infected. Thus, if the attack rate was 40%, then, assuming that an infinite number of patients were run
through the model, 40% of those with an effective contact would become infected with SARS-CoV-2
and 60% would not.
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Given the lack of robust data on either attack rates or effective contacts, and the potential ambiguity
in whether or not the increased used of personal protective equipment would decrease effective
contacts or the attack rate, it was decided that these would effectively be dealt with as one value
(the product of effective contacts and attack rates). As discussed in Results, an attempt was made to
calibrate the product of effective contacts and attack rates to observed data regarding the proportion
of hospital-identified COVID-19 patients who were not identified at the time the decision was made to
allocate a patient to a bay.
There is debate on whether or not the product of attack rate and effective contacts for asymptomatic
patients is equivalent to that of symptomatic patients. It is unclear whether or not the viral load differs,
but the lack of coughing in asymptomatic patients could reduce the transmission of SARS-CoV-2. Data
from Koh et al.21 indicate that the product of the attack rate and effective contacts of asymptomatic
patients is 39% (1/2.55) that of symptomatic patients; however, work undertaken by Grassly et al.22
suggests a value of 50% (range 10–100%). Given the wide uncertainty and suggestions from SCMs that
there may be no difference in infection rates, an arbitrary assumption was made that asymptomatic
patients had a product of attack rate and effective contacts that was 69% that of symptomatic patients.
Times to becoming infectious, developing symptoms if symptomatic, and becoming
non-infectious for a patient infected with SARS-CoV-2 in hospital
Patients and staff who have been infected have defined periods before they become infectious, have
clinical symptoms (if they are symptomatic), and reach a point at which they are no longer infectious
for SARS-CoV-2. These values, along with their sources, are shown in Table 7. It has been assumed that
symptomatic and asymptomatic patients have the same time to key milestones, although asymptomatic
patients have a lower probability of transmitting infection (see Effective contacts and attack rates).
The model updates the infectious status and the status of clinical symptoms for those who are simulated
to be symptomatic of patients every 6 simulated hours. This was believed to represent a compromise
between model complexity and sufficient accuracy, given the uncertainty of the decision problem.
If a patient becomes symptomatic after being infected in hospital, then they are moved to a SARS-CoV-2-
infected bay if they were in a non-SARS-CoV-2-infected bay, or moved to a SARS-CoV-2-infected ICU
bay if they were in a non-SARS-CoV-2-infected ICU bay.
The probability of patients infected with SARS-CoV-2 in hospital having a worse prognosis
The consequences of SARS-CoV-2 infections in hospital can vary by patient, although all patients
can infect other patients. It was assumed that two-thirds of patients would develop symptoms based
on the approximate mid-point of data reported by the Imperial College response team [Grassly22
(67%, range 50–80%), Lavezzo23 (57.5%, 95% confidence interval 45.4% to 68.5%), Riley23 (31%, 95%
confidence interval 24% to 39%), Clifford10 (76.8%, 95% confidence interval 50.5% to 94.1%, calculated
from the reported beta distribution)] and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention24 (50%).
TABLE 7 The assumed distributions related to key milestones in disease progression
Event: time from element 1 to element 2
Assumed time to
the event (days) Source
Infection to becoming infectious 3.4 Clifford et al.10
Becoming infectious to having clinical symptoms if patient develops COVID-19 2.3 He et al.11
Becoming infectious for SARS-CoV-2 to becoming non-infectious 7.1 Clifford et al.10
ESTIMATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE TESTS
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The probability that a person would need ICU care or die from COVID-19 was estimated from the
proportion of patients aged 70–74 years, an approximate median range of those attending A&E who
require hospitalisation due to COVID-1925 (24.3%), multiplied by the sum of the proportion of patients
hospitalised who require ICU care or who die in hospital [54.7%: 27.5% (see Table 4) + 27.2%, the
average of male and female patient deaths in hospital (see Table 5)]. This would equate to a risk of
a critical outcome (i.e. ICU care or death) of 8.9% (2/3 × 24.3% × 54.7%). This value is changed in
sensitivity analyses.
If a patient was simulated to have a critical outcome, then it would be sampled whether this outcome
was death or ICU care (where patients could still die) based on the probability of deaths in a general
bay by age band (see Table 5) and the proportions admitted to ICU by age band (see Table 4). This
resulted in the proportions shown in Table 8. Patients simulated to die in hospital prior to SARS-CoV-2
infection were assumed to not have their prognosis changed; those simulated to be admitted to ICU
prior to SARS-CoV-2 infection did not have their prognosis changed unless the SARS-CoV-2 infection
was simulated to result in death.
Testing strategies for patients arriving at accident and emergency
As described in The conceptual model: patients, the model has the functionality to employ two testing
strategies: to test all people arriving at A&E or to test only those about whom a decision has been
made to admit to hospital. Only the scenario of testing patients on admission to hospital has been
evaluated in this report.
TABLE 8 Proportion of critical outcomes caused by COVID-19 infections in hospital
that result in death before ICU admission
Age (years) Male patients Female patients
















≥ 90 0.940 0.924
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Characteristics of the point-of-care tests and laboratory-based tests
The POCTs for SARS-CoV-2 are hypothetical. The assumed diagnostic accuracies of the POCTs
and laboratory-based tests, the times for the result to become known by the treating physician, and
the failure rates used in the base-case model are shown in Table 9. Sensitivity analyses using these
parameters have been undertaken. It is assumed that neither the laboratory-based test nor the POCT
could detect SARS-CoV-2 until 0.5 days after infection, based on Jarvis et al.26 The model uses a
simplifying assumption that, until this point is reached, SARS-CoV-2 cannot be detected, although
false-positive tests could still occur in this situation. Beyond this time point the sensitivity values
reported in Table 9 are considered appropriate. All patients arriving at A&E with SARS-CoV-2 infection
are assumed to be at, or near, the peak of their viral levels.
The time required for the treating physician to receive the test result has an impact on the capacity
utilisation of the waiting bays. A shorter time for a test result would mean quicker allocation to either
a SARS-CoV-2-infected or a non-SARS-CoV-2-infected bay. These times are longer than the actual
processing times of POCTs and should take into account all relevant steps in the process. Sensitivity
analyses have been conducted using alternative times to obtain the result. The failure rates of all tests
have been set to that in the TPP.
In the base case for SARS-CoV-2 laboratory-based tests, a time of 35.9 hours was used, as this was
the median time reported by Collier et al.27 However, some hospitals may have access to more rapid
turnaround times, and sensitivity analyses have been run at 24 hours and at 6 hours.28 The sensitivity
of laboratory-based tests was assumed to be 89%, based on a meta-analysis conducted by Kim et al.,29
with a specificity of 100% following Grassly et al.22 It was believed that the sensitivity of SARS-CoV-2
tests might be reduced in asymptomatic patients. Based on data provided in Clifford et al.,10 the ratio
of sensitivities was assumed to be 82.6%, as values of 75% sensitivity in symptomatic patients and 62%
sensitivity in asymptomatic patients were reported.
For the SARS-CoV-2 POCTs, the TPPs published by the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory
Agency3 were used. These were divided into desired and acceptable characteristics. In addition, a sensitivity
TABLE 9 Assumed diagnostic accuracies, times to obtain the test result, and failure rates of POCTs and laboratory-based
















Base case 35.9 89.0 73.5 100 5
Sensitivity analysis 1 24 89.0 73.5 100 5




0.5 86.3 71.3 99 5
TPP – acceptablea 2 71.2 58.8 95 5
Data from currently
available tests




8 84.7 70 98.9 5
a Using laboratory-based testing as a reference for the sensitivity and specificity values reported in the TPP.
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analysis using data from currently available SARS-CoV-2 POCTs was used. In this scenario, the time to
obtain the result was assumed to be 3.8 hours, based on data presented in Collier et al.,27 with sensitivity
and specificity taken from a Cochrane review by Dinnes et al.30 but adjusted to take into consideration
that these were compared with laboratory-based tests, which were assumed to have imperfect sensitivity
(0.89; see Table 9). The sensitivity reported in Dinnes et al. was, therefore, multiplied by 0.89.
The cost of the hypothetical POCT is assumed to be £27.76,31 based on the 5.8 million DnaNudge test
the UK government has for £161M. The deal is likely to include 5000 platforms for running the tests
which overestimate the cost. The cost of a urine and plasma laboratory-based test (BioPorto, Hellerup,
Denmark) used to assess acute kidney failure in people considered for admission to critical care was
used as a proxy for the cost of a laboratory-based test, and was assumed to be £21.90.32 We have
assumed that the staff costs associated with POCTs and laboratory-based tests are equivalent. The
costs of tests are explored in sensitivity analyses. All costs used in the analyses are assumed to be in
Great British pounds in 2020.
Retesting strategies for patients admitted to hospital
Retesting strategies fall into three categories: retesting of those admitted to hospital who had a
failed test; routine retesting of those allocated to a non-SARS-CoV-2-infected bay following negative
SARS-CoV-2 tests; and, depending on the strategy chosen, retesting of patients with clinical symptoms
suggestive of COVID-19 who had a negative SARS-CoV-2 test.
Retest following test failure after admission to hospital
Patients admitted to hospital whose test result was a failure will be retested while they remain in the
appropriate waiting bay (SARS-CoV-2 infection suspected or SARS-CoV-2 infection not suspected) until
the result of at least one valid SARS-CoV-2 test is known (see Waiting for a decision on bed allocation for
more details).
Routine retesting following admission to hospital in a non-SARS-CoV-2 infection-
suspected bay
Following Department of Health and Social Care advice, patients in non-SARS-CoV-2 infection-suspected
bays will be retested.33 The aim of the retesting strategy is to enable the detection of patients who may
have been infected since their entry to hospital or whose viral load has increased during their hospital
stay. Patients who receive a positive test result will be moved to a SARS-CoV-2-infected bay. In the base-
case model, the default testing occurs 6 days from entry to the non-suspected SARS-CoV-2-infected bay.
Under this assumption, it is possible that more patients are retested when initial tests are quicker as
length of stay in hospital for each patient is assumed to be fixed, comprising time in a waiting bay and
time in a general bay. Thus, if more time is spent in a waiting bay, then less time is spent in the general
bay. Additional time in a waiting bay due to a slower initial test could mean that the patient is
discharged before being retested, whereas they would be retested if the initial test was quicker.
Retesting if the treating physician suspects a false-negative test
The base-case model assumes that all patients with clinical symptoms suggestive of COVID-19 will get
a second SARS-CoV-2 test if their first test result was negative. For simplicity, it is assumed that the
diagnostic accuracy of the second test is the same as that of the first test. It is acknowledged that
there may be reasons why a negative SARS-CoV-2 test result was obtained that would mean that the
two tests were not independent and that a false negative result was more likely, but also that viral
levels may increase between the two tests, which could reduce the chances of a false negative result.
In scenario analyses, the model has the functionality to allow a patient to remain in the waiting bay
until discharge, requirement for the ICU or death, if that patient has clinical symptoms suggestive of
COVID-19 but negative chest imaging results and underwent two SARS-CoV-2 tests that produced
negative results. In this scenario, it is assumed that if ICU care is needed the patient will go to a
SARS-CoV-2-infected ICU bay.
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Testing strategies for asymptomatic staff
The model has the functionality for staff to be tested at user-defined intervals, or for a strategy of no
staff testing to be employed. In both the testing and the no-testing strategies, it has been assumed
that any staff member with clinical symptoms indicative of COVID-19, due to infection either in the
community or in the hospital, would be removed from duty.
Staff testing can be undertaken with either POCTs or laboratory-based tests. The characteristics of the
tests are the same as those for patients. There is a delay in the staff test result becoming available in
line with the SARS-CoV-2 test used (POCT or laboratory based). Those staff members with a positive
SARS-CoV-2 test result would be removed from duty. When testing of asymptomatic staff is employed,
the duration between tests is user-definable. It is assumed that if a staff member has a test result that
is a failure they will wait until the next test period to receive a second test, assuming that they do not
develop clinical symptoms suggestive of COVID-19 in the interim.
Length of stay in the hospital
For patients with COVID-19, the distribution of length of stay conditional on being discharged alive
or dead is depicted in the appendix of Docherty et al.9 It was assumed that for patients who died in
hospital the distribution could be represented by a log-normal distribution with a mean of 2.00 and a
standard deviation of 0.79, which give values resembling the mode and the percentage of people alive
at 14 days. For patients alive at discharge, a distinction was made between those aged < 70 years and
those aged ≥ 70 years. For the younger group a log-normal distribution with a mean of 1.95 and a
standard deviation of 0.59 was assumed; and for the older group a log-normal distribution with a mean
of 2.29 and a standard deviation of 0.59 was assumed.
For patients admitted to hospital without SARS-CoV-2 infection the average number of nights spent
in hospital was 7.5.8 For simplicity, it was assumed that this could be represented by a triangular
distribution (1, 5, 12) for patients aged ≤ 69 years and a triangular distribution (6, 12, 18) for patients
aged ≥ 70 years. For simplicity, it was assumed that these outcomes were independent of other
outcomes (discharge, ICU care or death).
For patients admitted to ICU it was assumed that the length of stay was 2 days regardless of age,
SARS-CoV-2 infection status, or outcome based on data presented to the NICE diagnostic committee.32
The time in post-ICU beds was set at 4 days also independent of age and SARS-CoV-2 infection status.
Quality-adjusted life-years lost through death in the hospital
The model estimates the additional discounted quality-adjusted life-years (QALYs) lost assuming a
discount rate of 3.5% per annum as recommended by NICE,4 and life-years lost through SARS-CoV-2
infections acquired within the hospital for admitted patients. These values have been estimated using
2016–18 data from Office for National Statistics life tables34 and age- and sex-adjusted general
population utility values reported by Ara and Brazier,35 and take into account the death rates at each
age by sex, the utility by age and sex, and the NICE recommended discount rate. Patients who are
younger will therefore have greater expected QALYs than older patients as they are expected to both
live longer and have a higher utility at the start of the model.
Example values of the estimated QALY losses and life-years lost for selected ages are provided
in Table 10.
For patients who were infected with SARS-CoV-2 in hospital but were discharged alive, a multiplier can
be applied to take into consideration that the QALYs gained would be lower than that of the average
age- and sex-matched patients due to reduced life expectancy and/or reduced quality of life. No data
were found to populate these multipliers; an arbitrary value of 0.8 was applied for patients who needed
ICU care as a result of a SARS-CoV-2 infection acquired in hospital. For patients who did not require
ICU care the multiplier was set to 1 to signify no loss in expected future QALYs.
ESTIMATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE TESTS




Initially, 10 strategies were modelled, as shown in Table 11. All of these used the base-case values for
the laboratory-based test and the POCT, as shown in Table 9. Further scenario analyses were run
using the variations in Table 9, which included reduced times for the laboratory based-tests, using the
acceptable TPP for POCTs and data from currently available POCTs.27,30 It was assumed that there
were sufficient testing kits, reagents and consumables for all SARS-CoV-2 tests. We did not assess any
strategies that used confirmatory laboratory-based SARS-CoV-2 tests after a SARS-CoV-2 POCT.
Sensitivity analyses were undertaken on selected strategies to show the sensitivity of the model to
changes in key assumptions. These are detailed in Sensitivity analyses applied to strategy 22, strategy 24
and strategy 25.
TABLE 10 The discounted QALYs lost and life-years lost associated with death following
SARS-CoV-2 infection in hospital at selected ages
Patient age (years)
QALYs lost Life-years lost
Male Female Male Female
30 19.24 18.85 50.10 53.52
40 17.15 16.96 40.57 43.80
50 14.71 14.73 31.38 34.33
60 11.87 12.12 22.67 25.28
70 8.76 9.13 14.87 16.91
80 5.64 5.96 8.39 9.69
90 3.18 3.28 4.06 4.61





Retest those with clinical symptoms

















based tests (35.9 hours)
SARS-CoV-2 POCTs (30 minutes) No SARS-CoV-2 test
Time within the cell indicates the turnaround time for a test. These values are changed in scenario analyses
(see Table 12).
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Further strategies were run that expanded on those outlined in Table 11. These, along with a description,
are provided in Table 12; the analyses are not exhaustive but it is believed that inferences can be made
for any strategies not explicitly run.
Calibration of the model
It is acknowledged that many parameter estimates are uncertain or have no data (e.g. effective contacts and
attack rates). To attempt to provide meaningful results, the product of effective contacts and attack rates
was calibrated. Carter et al.36 reported that approximately 8.7% of the total patients diagnosed (i.e. those
diagnosed at admission plus those diagnosed after admission) had nosocomial infections.We therefore set a
target for the number of patients moved from non-SARS-CoV-2-infected bays to SARS-CoV-2-infected bays
as approximately 8.7% of the sum of those patients identified as SARS-CoV-2 infected at admission and the
numbers moved to SARS-CoV-2-infected bays in strategy 1, using 50 random number streams.
In the absence of data, the product of the number of effective contacts and attack rates per infectious
person (θ1) was assumed to be the same in each bay, with the exception that this was assumed to be
31% lower for symptomatic patients (see Effective contacts and attack rates). θ1 was assumed applicable
for patient-to-patient contact and staff-to-staff contact while waiting for a decision on admission, and
for staff-to-staff contact for those working within the distinct areas of testing, discharge and informing
patients of the admission decision. For the staff and patient contact during testing, discharge and
informing the patient of the decision to admit to hospital or discharge, it was assumed that the product
of effective contacts and attack rate was θ1/100.
In the calibration analysis it was assumed that the base-case laboratory-based SARS-CoV-2 test was used
and that there was no retesting following negative SARS-CoV-2 tests, but that all patients with clinical
symptoms of COVID-19 and chest imaging suggestive of COVID-19 would be allocated to a SARS-CoV-2-
infected bay. Following calibration, θ1 was assumed to be 0.096 which estimated from 100 simulation runs
that of the total number of identified COVID-19 cases 8.7% were identified after admission to a bay.





11 As strategy 2 but using a time to test result of
24 hours for the laboratory-based test
21 As strategy 6 but using a time to test result of
6 hours for the laboratory-based test
12 As strategy 2 but using a time to test result of
6 hours for the laboratory-based test
22 As strategy 7 but using a time to test result of
24 hours for the laboratory-based test
13 As strategy 3 but using the acceptable TPP
for POCTs
23 As strategy 7 but using a time to test result of
6 hours for the laboratory-based test
14 As strategy 3 but using data from currently
available POCTs
24 As strategy 8 but using the acceptable TPP
for POCTs
15 As strategy 14 but using a time to test result of
8 hours
25 As strategy 8 but using data from currently
available POCTs
16 As strategy 4 but using the acceptable TPP
for POCTs
26 As strategy 25 but using a time to test result
of 8 hours
17 As strategy 4 but using data from currently
available POCTs
27 As strategy 9 but using the acceptable TPP
for POCTs
18 As strategy 5 but using a time to test result of
24 hours for the laboratory-based test
28 As strategy 9 but using data from currently
available POCTs
19 As strategy 5 but using a time to test result of
6 hours for the laboratory-based test
29 As strategy 10 but using a time to test result
of 24 hours for the laboratory-based test
20 As strategy 6 but using a time to test result of
24 hours for the laboratory-based test
30 As strategy 10 but using a time to test result
of 6 hours for the laboratory-based test
To aid comprehension, these scenario analyses have been given a strategy number.
ESTIMATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE TESTS
NIHR Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
22
The number of different random number streams used per analysis
As with all individual-patient-based models, there is the possibility of ‘first-order’ uncertainty, which is
the phenomenon that identical patients do not get identical outcomes because of the random numbers
drawn to simulate whether or not a patient has an event of interest. The results for a given strategy will
therefore change depending on the random number stream seed selected, as will the comparative results
with alternative strategies/scenarios even when the same random number seed is used, as the allocation
of random numbers will differ between the strategies/scenarios. To reduce the impact of random number
streams, sufficient simulations, using different random number seeds, should be undertaken.
Analyses were undertaken to assess the variability in the mean results as the number of simulations
were increased using a near-final version of the calibration model. Figure 2 depicts the number of
patients infected in the hospital across each simulation and the average across all prior simulations
and the current one.
There is a trade-off between decreased model computation time and improved accuracy as more
simulations with different random number streams are undertaken. Considering both aspects, we
assumed that 50 random number streams would be sufficient to provide indicative results for number
of infections in the hospital, which was believed to be an important outcome measure. For more rare
events, such as critical events caused by SARS-CoV-2 infections, the presence of Monte Carlo sampling
error (the differences in results purely due to the random numbers used) is significantly larger. To
present meaningful results, regressions were undertaken of estimated QALYs lost through death in
hospital as a result of SARS-CoV-2 infection and of estimated QALYs gained after COVID-19-related
ICU stays caused by SARS-CoV-2 infection in hospital. The results of the regression were used in
preference to the actual simulated results.
The use of net monetary benefit
As ratios of incremental costs divided by incremental QALYs, incremental cost-effectiveness ratios
(ICERs) can be misleading when incremental QALY gains are low or when the estimated values are
very close between two interventions and one is stated to be dominating the other. Incremental net
monetary benefit, which is defined as the cost-per-QALY threshold multiplied by the incremental
QALY gain minus the incremental cost,37 removes these limitations. For brevity, incremental net monetary
benefit will be shortened to net monetary benefit (NMB) throughout this report. Within this framework, the
largest NMB is associated with the most cost-effective strategy at the stated cost-per-QALY distribution,
and multiple strategies can be compared simultaneously, as the absolute difference in strategies in terms
of cost, having monetarised health differences, can be easily determined. These analyses have been
undertaken at assumed cost-per-QALY thresholds of £20,000, £30,000 and £50,000, which are used in
NICE technology appraisals,4 with the highest value used for treatments that meet end-of-life criteria.
Results
The estimated number of infections per strategy
Figure 3 provides the modelled number of infections for each of the 30 strategies listed in Tables 11 and 12
for patients infected after a decision to admit to hospital. SARS-CoV-2 infections that occur in people
not admitted to hospital have been excluded, as these are similar for all strategies and differ only as a
result of Monte Carlo sampling error. The excluded infections total approximately 27 per simulation.
Strategy 1, which was believed to have been used in many hospitals during the early response to
SARS-CoV-2 infection, is seen to result in the largest number of infections. As expected, SARS-CoV-2
POCTs with the desirable TPP result in fewer infections than SARS-CoV-2 POCTs with the acceptable
TPP, and tests with a quicker turnaround time result in fewer infections.
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The estimated occupancy level in the infinite bays
As described in The configuration of the hospitals used in the example, the example hospital had infinite
bays to acknowledge that patients would be treated somewhere in the hospital or transferred to an
alternative facility. One possible advantage of SARS-CoV-2 POCTs is the potential for allocating patients
more quickly to a SARS-CoV-2-infected bay or a non-SARS-CoV-2-infected bay, thus reducing occupancy
pressure on the waiting bays. Figures have been produced that indicate the level of occupancy in the
infinite bays; these are in Figure 4 for strategy 1 and in Figures 18 and 19 (see Appendix 1) for the
remaining strategies. There are two things to note for these analyses. First, Simul8 does not have the
capability to produce such figures using multiple random number streams and so a particular random
number stream has been selected. This was the random number stream that produced the estimated
amount of time in the waiting bays closest to the mean value across the 50 streams. Second, Simul8
provides the average occupancy across the full Simul8-modelled time horizon of 200 days, although
patients stop entering the model after 90 days; the default occupancy level is, therefore, approximately
half of the actual value, and an inspection of the underlying data is more informative.
Figure 4 shows the occupancy levels of the infinite bays among people waiting for a decision about
allocation to a SARS-CoV-2-infected bay or a non-SARS-CoV-2-infected bay. Among SARS-CoV-2-
infected patients, non-SARS-CoV-2-infected patients, SARS-CoV-2-infected patients post ICU and
non-SARS-CoV-2-infected patients post ICU, none entered the infinitely sized ICU, so figures for
these are not presented. For information, SARS-CoV-2-infected patients entered a fifth ICU bay,
non-SARS-CoV-2-infected patients entered a fourth ICU bay, SARS-CoV-2-infected patients post ICU
entered a sixth bay and non-SARS-CoV-2-infected patients post ICU entered a fourth bay. Occupancy
levels in areas where people waited for the decision to be made about whether or not they will be
admitted to hospital have not been presented as these levels would be unaffected by which test is used.
As the impact of the SARS-CoV-2 tests is likely to lead to differences in the occupancy of waiting bays
before patients are allocated to a SARS-CoV-2-infected bay or a non-SARS-CoV-2-infected bay, only
the occupancy levels in these two infinite bays are presented in Appendix 1 (see Figures 18 and 19).
As anticipated, the tests with the shorter turnaround times resulted in lower occupancy levels in the
waiting bays, with patients spending correspondingly more time in SARS-CoV-2-infected or non-SARS-
CoV-2-infected bays. The desired TPP for SARS-CoV-2 POCTs (strategy 3) resulted in three single-bed
bays being required for patients with clinical symptoms suggestive of COVID-19 and one single-bed
bay being required for those without clinical symptoms suggestive of COVID-19. By contrast, strategy 1
required the infinite bays for both those with and those without clinical symptoms suggestive of COVID-19.
As shown in Figure 4, among patients with clinical symptoms of COVID-19 the occupancy rate (labelled
‘work’ in the Simul8 output) in the infinite bay reached a maximum of 33, and among patients without
clinical symptoms of COVID-19 the occupancy rate in the infinite bay reached a maximum of 7. To aid
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FIGURE 3 The estimated number of infections per strategy.
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Time spent in bays waiting to be allocated to a SARS-CoV-2-infected bay or a
non-SARS-CoV-2-infected bay
An impact of different turnaround times for SARS-CoV-2 tests is differences in the time patients spend
in waiting bays before being allocated to a SARS-CoV-2-infected bay or a non-SARS-CoV-2-infected
bay, with times reduced in general bays on the assumption that the waiting time does not affect a
patient’s overall time in hospital. The time spent in relevant bays is provided in Figure 5. Monte Carlo
sampling error means that the total time in the bays is not identical for all strategies, although it is
relatively similar, with the range between the highest and lowest summed value representing < 0.4%
of the average total time.
Estimating the discounted quality-adjusted life-years lost due to death from
SARS-CoV-2 infection
The model has the functionality to estimate the number of SARS-CoV-2 infections in hospital that result
in a critical outcome (divided separately by the requirement for ICU care or by death). However, for rare
events the Monte-Carlo sampling error is much greater and it was seen that 50 random number streams
were not sufficient to remove this. To produce meaningful results a linear regression was undertaken to
provide a general relationship between the number of infections and the number of deaths, as it was
believed that the SARS-CoV-2 test employed would not influence the outcomes. A plot of infections
and estimated QALY losses is provided in Figure 6, which uses as data points the results from the 30
strategies and the results from the sensitivity analyses detailed in Sensitivity analyses applied to strategy 22,
strategy 24 and strategy 25, and in Appendix 2, which evaluates strategy 25 as well as strategy 22 and














































FIGURE 4 The occupancy level in the infinite bay. (a) For patients with clinical symptoms suggestive of COVID-19 while
waiting for a decision on whether or not to allocate to a SARS-CoV-2-infected hospital bay; (b) for patients with clinical
symptoms not suggestive of COVID-19 while waiting for a decision on whether or not to allocate to a SARS-CoV-2-
infected hospital bay; (c) for patients allocated to a SARS-CoV-2-infected bay; and (d) for patients allocated to a
non-SARS-CoV-2-infected bay.
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It has been recently reported that if patients become co-infected with both SARS-CoV-2 and influenza
then the odds of mortality increase by 2.27 (95% confidence interval 1.23 to 4.19) compared with
SARS-CoV-2 infection alone.38 These figures are presumed to refer to SARS-CoV-2 infection that
becomes COVID-19. The model does not include the potential for increased risks following co-infection,
which may represent a limitation.
The estimated QALY losses associated with each strategy are shown in Figure 7.
Estimating the discounted quality-adjusted life-years lost owing to requirement of
intensive care unit care for SARS-CoV-2 infection
The model has the functionality to estimate the number of QALYs that are accrued for patients after
they are discharged alive from ICU. It is anticipated that, following ICU care, the length and/or quality
of life of these patients may be impaired compared with that of patients who have not had ICU care.
An arbitrary QALY multiplier of 0.9 has been incorporated to take into account the loss of QALYs
following ICU care, loosely based on the impact observed by Cuthbertson et al.39 at 5 years for patients
who had a severe sepsis episode. There was noticeable Monte Carlo sampling error for these values
and, as with QALYs lost from death, a relationship was estimated using linear regression. The regression
model fitted is shown in Figure 8 and allows the number of QALYs gained after ICU to be calculated
from the estimated number of SARS-CoV-2 infections.
The estimated QALYs gained post ICU for each strategy have been multiplied by 0.1 to obtain an
estimate of the number of QALY losses caused by additional requirement for ICU care. These data are
presented in Figure 9.
Estimating the number of tests performed, by strategy
The numbers of tests undertaken for each strategy are shown in Figure 10. These are divided into the
number of tests undertaken before allocation to a SARS-CoV-2-infected bay or a non-SARS-CoV-2-
infected bay and the number of routine retests in non-SARS-CoV-2-infected bays or in staff, as some
strategies use laboratory-based SARS-CoV-2 tests for one group and SARS-CoV-2 POCTs for the
other group.
40
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FIGURE 6 Relationship between number of infections and simulated QALY losses due to SARS-CoV-2 infection among
hospitalised patients.
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Estimating the costs of tests performed, by strategy
The estimated costs of tests undertaken for each strategy are shown in Figure 11. These are divided into
the costs of tests prior to allocation to a SARS-CoV-2-infected bay or a non-SARS-CoV-2-infected bay
and the costs of routine retests in non-SARS-CoV-2-infected bays or in staff, as some strategies use
laboratory-based SARS-CoV-2 tests for one group and SARS-CoV-2 POCTs for the other.
Estimating the costs of additional intensive care unit requirement
The model calculated the time spent in ICU with each strategy, as some patients infected with
SARS-CoV-2 may require ICU care when they did not previously. Analyses were performed looking
at the relationship between the number of infections in hospitals and the increased time associated
with ICU care. The relationship was positive but very weak (R2 < 0.001) and so these costs have been
omitted, which may be unfavourable to more accurate SARS-CoV-2 tests.
Estimating the cost-effectiveness of the strategies
The model calculated the estimated QALY losses for each strategy. These need to be transformed
into QALY gains to be interpreted using the usual method. As a result, the QALY losses have been
subtracted from a constant number (50); this does not affect the differences between strategies and
hence the ICER and NMB values are not affected. The costs of testing and the transformed QALYs
associated with each strategy are shown in Table 13.
A full incremental analysis has been performed providing ICERs (in terms of the incremental cost per
QALY gained) for those strategies on the efficiency frontier. The efficiency frontier includes only those
points that are not dominated (dominated: providing equal or fewer QALYs at higher cost, or fewer
QALYs at an equal or higher cost) by a single strategy, or that are not extendedly dominated. A strategy
is extendedly dominated when a combination of two other strategies results in combined cost and QALY
values that would dominate the initial strategy.
However, the full incremental analyses have little meaning, as the desirable TPP for a POCT will
always dominate a POCT with an acceptable TPP and yet these may not be choices available to the
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FIGURE 8 Relationship between number of infections and simulated QALY losses due to SARS-CoV-2 infection in
hospitalised patients.
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As ratios of incremental costs divided by incremental QALYs, ICERs can be misleading when incremental
QALY gains are low or when the estimated values are very close between two interventions and one is
stated to be dominating the other. NMB is helpful for removing these limitations, although it requires a
threshold for the cost-per-QALY ratio to be stated, which is a decision made by the NICE committee.
NMB values are presented here using threshold values of £20,000, £30,000 and £50,000 per QALY
gained for all strategies compared with strategy 1. These supplementary data are presented in Figure 12.
The NMB values are those associated with all 22,500 patients entering the hypothetical hospital during
the 90-day period.
TABLE 13 The costs and QALYs associated with each strategy and a full incremental analysis
Strategy number Cost of testing (£) 50 –QALYs lost Efficiency frontier (£)
1 112,416 33.81 –
2 140,849 35.56 Extendedly dominated
11 145,745 35.78 Extendedly dominated
5 147,922 35.86 Extendedly dominated
18 154,174 35.93 Extendedly dominated
12 154,280 38.46 9003
19 164,783 38.68 Extendedly dominated
6 179,564 36.61 Dominated
20 183,198 36.77 Dominated
17 185,817 38.25 Dominated
16 185,889 36.31 Dominated
4 187,209 39.32 Extendedly dominated
21 189,360 38.56 Dominated
15 193,851 37.15 Dominated
13 195,743 35.80 Dominated
14 196,501 38.18 Dominated
3 198,217 39.53 Extendedly dominated
7 208,196 38.86 Dominated
22 213,279 39.02 Dominated
23 221,579 40.64 30,899
10 233,537 38.83 Dominated
29 239,515 38.71 Dominated
30 250,014 40.99 Extendedly dominated
28 252,965 40.27 Dominated
27 253,016 38.08 Dominated
9 254,316 41.23 54,733
26 278,931 39.57 Dominated
24 280,828 38.72 Dominated
25 281,597 40.52 Dominated
8 283,233 41.24 5,257,711
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It is cautioned that the cost-effectiveness analyses should not be taken in isolation. In addition to
the uncertainty within the model, the characteristics of the POCT or laboratory-based SARS-CoV-2
tests may not exist or may not be available, and some strategies may not be feasible because of the
configuration of the hospital. The data provided in The estimated occupancy level in the infinite bays,
Time spent in bays waiting for allocation to a SARS-CoV-2-infected bay or a non-SARS-CoV-2-infected bay
and Appendix 1 should be considered alongside the cost-effectiveness output.
In addition, for each of the 30 strategies evaluated in the main report, data were extracted for patients
discharged after admission to hospital on the estimated numbers of people in three groups: ‘correct
isolation’, ‘missed isolation’ and ‘unnecessary isolation’. Respectively, these groups comprised patients
who had SARS-CoV-2 infection and were correctly told this information; had SARS-CoV-2 infection and
were not told this information, because they had either a negative test result or a failed test result that
was not repeated; and did not have SARS-CoV-2 infection but were told that they did.
The missed isolation group represents people who should be self-isolating but were told that this was
not required, whereas the unnecessary isolation group represents people who were told that they
should self-isolate even though this was not required. The estimated results are presented in Figure 13.
These values include the results of SARS-CoV-2 tests that become known after the patient has been
discharged, with the results conveyed to the patient when they are at home. It is seen that strategies
that use the acceptable TPP for SARS-CoV-2 POCTs (strategies 13, 16, 24 and 27) are associated with
increased numbers of unnecessary isolations as a result of the lower specificity associated with this
TPP. This may have negative impacts if there are other pressures on isolation bays.
Sensitivity analyses undertaken
There is considerable uncertainty relating to the parameters within the model. This has been explored in
sensitivity analyses, although these were constrained by the deadlines for the report. Where additional
runs of the model were necessary, three strategies that may be plausible were selected: strategy 22, in
which patients and staff are tested using a laboratory-based SARS-CoV-2 test that takes 24 hours, was
compared with strategy 24, which differs from strategy 22 as a SARS-CoV-2 POCTwith an acceptable
TPP was used rather than the 24-hour laboratory test, and strategy 25, in which the laboratory-based
test was replaced with data from currently available SARS-CoV-2 POCTs. The change in the difference
in key outcomes between the strategies may be informative to the committee.
A further set of sensitivity analyses were run, removing the testing of asymptomatic staff using
strategy 2 and strategy 14 to provide indicative results. Strategy 2 assumes a laboratory-based
SARS-CoV-2 test with a turnaround time of 35.9 hours, whereas strategy 14 uses data from currently
available SARS-CoV-2 POCTs. The change in the difference in key outcomes between the strategies
may be informative to the committee. As turnaround time was a key element of the decision problem,
additional sensitivity analyses were undertaken that varied the turnaround time of the laboratory-
based SARS-CoV-2 test in strategy 2 and of the SARS-CoV-2 POCT in strategy 14.
A final set of sensitivity analyses were run that explored the estimated number of infections if
SARS-CoV-2 testing were not possible.
When interpreting the results, it should be noted that the model was not recalibrated for all sensitivity
analyses described here. However, the model was recalibrated for three sensitivity analyses: (1) the
relative product of attack rate and effective contacts for asymptomatic patients to that of symptomatic
patients, (2) where the time before a patient became non-infectious was increased and (3) where it was
assumed that the laboratory-based SARS-CoV-2 test had a turnaround time of 21.3 hours. Recalibration
was necessary because (1) these were not believed to be changes that have occurred since the early
stages of the pandemic but would have been the values throughout the simulation and (2) these were
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shown to significantly affect the results when the model was not recalibrated. For the reduction in
asymptomatic product of attack rates and effective contacts, θ1 was 0.1285; this value was 0.0759
when the time to becoming non-infectious was increased and 0.0885 when the turnaround time of the
laboratory-based SARS-CoV-2 test was assumed to be 21.3 hours. θ1 increasing when the turnaround
time of a laboratory-based test was decreased was unexpected. On inspection, this could be explained
as the model being calibrated based on those who received a positive SARS-CoV-2 test while in hospital.
When the test took 35.9 hours, more patients had been discharged from hospital at the time of the
result being known than if the SARS-CoV-2 test took 24 hours. Only patients in hospital at the time of
the test result becoming available contributed to the calibration.
Sensitivity analyses applied to all strategies
The following scenario analyses could be applied after the model runs: setting the cost of laboratory
tests equal to the costs of POCTs; increasing the multiplier for QALYs gained post ICU to 1; decreasing
the multiplier for QALYs gained post ICU to 0.8; and reducing the proportion of SARS-CoV-2 infections
that resulted in critical outcomes by 90%.
Setting the costs of laboratory-based SARS-CoV-2 tests equal to the costs of SARS-CoV-2
point-of-care tests
Characteristics of the point-of-care tests and laboratory-based tests details that the costs assumed per
test were £27.76 for a POCT and £21.90 for a laboratory-based test. Sensitivity analyses have been
performed setting both costs equal to £27.76. As anticipated, the results are more favourable to POCTs.
The NMB analyses in this scenario are shown in Figure 14. The efficiency frontier becomes strategy 1,
strategy 3 (£3520) and strategy 8 (£49,702).
Amending the multiplier associated with quality-adjusted life-years gained post intensive
care unit care caused by a SARS-CoV-2 infection
The multiplier used post ICU was 0.9, although this was arbitrary (see Estimating the discounted
quality-adjusted life-years lost owing to requirement of intensive care unit care for SARS-CoV-2 infection).
Analyses have been run assuming that this increased to 1 (indicating that ICU had no effect on length
or quality of life after discharge) and decreased to 0.8.
When the multiplier was 1, the strategies on the efficiency frontier remained strategy 1, strategy 12
(£10,247), strategy 23 (£35,171), strategy 9 (£62,300) and strategy 8 (£5,984,563). The NMB for this
sensitivity analysis is provided in Figure 20 (see Appendix 2).
When the multiplier was 0.8, the strategies on the efficiency frontier remained strategy 1, strategy 12
(£8028), strategy 23 (£27,333), strategy 9 (£48,805) and strategy 8 (£4,688,296). The NMB for this
sensitivity analysis is provided in Figure 21 (see Appendix 2).
Reducing the proportion of patients infected with SARS-CoV-2 who have a critical outcome
The chance of a patient being infected with SARS-CoV-2 in hospital and now requiring ICU care or
dying was detailed in The probability of patients infected with SARS-CoV-2 in hospital having a worse
prognosis, with a value of 8.9% used in the base case. This value was based on many assumptions,
including the proportion of SARS-CoV-2 infections that are symptomatic, which may be overestimated
if there are a large number of unreported symptomatic cases, or if fatality rates have improved due to
treatment enhancement since SARS-CoV-2 was identified. A sensitivity analysis was performed that
reduced the risk of a critical outcome by 90%. It is seen (Figure 15) that this markedly changed the
results, with strategy 1 having the highest NMB as it was the cheapest in terms of testing costs. The
elements on the efficiency frontier were the same, but the ICERs were 10 times higher: strategy 1,
strategy 12 (£90,025), strategy 23 (£308,993), strategy 9 (£547,329) and strategy 8 (£52,577,110).
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Sensitivity analyses applied to strategy 22, strategy 24 and strategy 25
As described, these strategies have been chosen to represent a plausible laboratory-based SARS-CoV-2
test and a potentially plausible SARS-CoV-2 POCT.
In the base case, there were an estimated 180.04 infections after admission to hospital in strategy 22,
while there were an estimated 184.44 infections after admission to hospital in strategy 24 and 158.26
infections in strategy 25. Strategy 22 was estimated to dominate strategy 24, with an increase of 0.30
QALYs and a saving of £67,549. Strategy 25 had an ICER of £45,635 compared with strategy 22,
providing 1.50 more QALYs at an additional cost of £68,318, as shown in Table 14.
The following sensitivity analyses were run: assuming that clinicians do not over-ride negative
SARS-CoV-2 test results; amending the product of effective contacts and attack rates; allowing a pink
bay; allowing patients to stay in waiting bays until they are discharged; ICU or death following two
negative SARS-CoV-2 tests; allowing patient and staff immunity; amending the hospital configuration;
changing the number of patients attending A&E per day; reducing the proportion of patients attending
A&E with conditions that do not necessitate hospitalisation; changing the ratio of patients with clinical
symptoms suggestive of COVID-19 between those with COVID-19 and those without; removing the
possibility that staff were infected in the community; changing the test failure rate; assuming that
failed SARS-CoV-2 tests would be interpreted as negative results for SARS-CoV-2 infection; increasing
the length of time for which a person with SARS-CoV-2 is infectious; decreasing the turnaround
time for laboratory-based SARS-CoV-2 tests; and assuming a lower attack rate for people with
asymptomatic SARS-CoV-2 infection.
A summary of how these sensitivity analyses affect the number of patients infected is shown in Table 15.
A description of each sensitivity analysis is presented below. Given the small differences between the
three strategies, it is unclear the extent to which Monte Carlo sampling error may have an impact on
the results.
Assuming clinicians do not over-ride a negative SARS-CoV-2 test
The base-case model assumes that patients who have clinical symptoms of COVID-19 and who have
chest imaging results suggestive of COVID-19 would be moved to a SARS-CoV-2-infected bay despite
two negative tests. In sensitivity analyses, clinicians were assumed not to over-ride SARS-CoV-2 test
results in order to explore the impact of this on the results. These results are provided in Table 18
(see Appendix 2), with the ICER for strategy 25 compared with strategy 22 reducing to £32,177
compared with the base-case value of £45,625 (see Table 14).
It may be inferred that if SARS-CoV-2 tests are significantly accurate then clinicians over-riding the
SARS-CoV-2 tests and placing patients with other diseases such as pneumonia into bays containing
patients with COVID-19 may harm patients, as QALYs increase when it is assumed that no SARS-CoV-2
tests are over-ridden. However, if the chest imaging method is sufficiently accurate, this conclusion may
be changed (see Changing the assumed sensitivity and specificity of chest imaging).
TABLE 14 Base-case results for strategies 22, 24 and 25
Strategy Testing costs (£) 50 –QALYs lost Efficiency frontier (ICER) (£)
22 213,279 39.02 –
24 280,828 38.72 Dominated
25 281,597 40.52 45,625
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TABLE 15 The estimated numbers of patients infected during a hospital stay in strategy 22, strategy 24 and strategy 25
and the efficiency frontier in the sensitivity analyses undertaken
Sensitivity analysis
Number of patients infected













Base case 180.04 184.44 158.26 – Dominated 32,177
Assuming that clinicians do not over-ride a
negative SARS-CoV-2 test
124.50 141.82 90.68 – Dominated 32,177
Halving the product of attack rates and effective
contacts
77.52 83.40 66.74 – Dominated 91,984
Doubling the product of attack rates and effective
contacts
441.16 399.50 373.46 – Extendedly
dominated
14,845
Allowing pink bays 186.54 178.78 154.72 – Extendedly
dominated
32,250
Allowing patients with two negative SARS-CoV-2
tests but with clinical symptoms to remain in the
waiting bay
182.22 179.12 160.34 – Extendedly
dominated
39,746
Assuming that 10% of patients and staff without
SARS-CoV-2 infection are immune
155.48 163.50 136.06 – Dominated 51,256
All bays are single-bedded apart from the
infinite bay
159.28 161.76 133.98 – Dominated 39,254
No single-bedded bays for those with clinical
symptoms suggestive of COVID-19 awaiting
allocation to a SARS-CoV-2-infected bay or a
non-SARS-CoV-2-infected bay
188.46 191.16 158.26 – Dominated 33,036
Increasing the number of patients attending
A&E to 350 per day
236.18 243.04 212.24 – Dominated 53,808
Decreasing the number of patients attending
A&E to 150 per day
123.10 126.00 100.20 – Dominated 30,927
Decrease in the proportion of patients without
SARS-CoV-2 infection and who do not need to
be hospitalised
179.16 180.26 161.24 – Dominated 43,459
Decrease in the proportion of patients without
SARS-CoV-2 infection who need to be hospitalised
and who do not have clinical symptoms suggestive
of COVID-19
147.48 154.94 118.58 – Extendedly
Dominated
24,879
Assuming that staff cannot get infected with
SARS-CoV-2 in the community
179.16 180.26 155.50 – Dominated 32,769
Changing the failure rates of SARS-CoV-2 tests
to 1%
175.86 175.36 160.48 – Dominated 53,266
Changing the failure rates of SARS-CoV-2 tests
to 10%
189.92 187.72 155.50 – Extendedly
dominated
36,507
Using the sensitivity and specificity of detecting
COVID-19 from data relating to computed
tomography
181.60 174.24 162.76 – Extendedly
dominated
30,010
Assuming that the breakdown of patients
attending A&E was as follows: SARS-CoV-2
infected needing hospitalisation, 10%; SARS-CoV-2
infected not needing hospitalisation, 5%;
non-SARS-CoV-2 infected needing hospitalisation,
11%; non-SARS-CoV-2 infected not needing
hospitalisation, 74%
248.78 245.56 203.80 – Dominated Dominated
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Changing the product of effective contacts and attack rates
There is considerable uncertainty in both the attack rates and the number of effective contacts, although
this was mitigated to some extent by the calibration undertaken that was described in Calibration of the
model. Sensitivity analyses were undertaken with the product of effective contacts and attack rates
halved and doubled compared with the start of the pandemic. These analyses could represent better
knowledge and protective equipment or more crowding in hospitals, respectively. As anticipated, the
ICER increases for the more clinically effective strategy when the product of attack rates and effective
contacts is halved (see Appendix 2, Table 19) but decreases when the product of attack rates and effective
contacts is doubled (see Appendix 2, Table 20). When the product was doubled, strategy 24 was no longer
dominated by strategy 22 and had an ICER of £23,967 compared with strategy 22.
Allowing the hospital to use pink bays
Pink bays are described in Waiting for a decision on bed allocation. When these were used, the direction
in the change in the number of patients infected in hospital was inconsistent, as it increased in strategy
22, but decreased in strategy 24 and strategy 25, which is expected to be due to Monte Carlo sampling
error. The ICER for strategy 25 compared with strategy 22 decreased with the introduction of pink
bays (see Appendix 2, Table 21). When pink bays were utilised, strategy 24 was no longer dominated
by strategy 22 and had an ICER of £130,646 compared with strategy 22.
Allowing patients with two negative SARS-CoV-2 tests but with clinical symptoms to remain
in the waiting bay
Rather than being discharged to either a SARS-CoV-2-infected bay or a non-SARS-CoV-2-infected bay,
this sensitivity analyses explored the impact of allowing patients with clinical symptoms of COVID-19
but with two negative tests to remain in the waiting bay until discharge, ICU care or death. The ICER
of strategy 25 compared with strategy 22 decreased and strategy 24 was no longer dominated by
strategy 22 but had an ICER of £272, 570 compared with strategy 22 (see Appendix 2, Table 22).
Assuming that 10% of patients and staff without SARS-CoV-2 infection are immune
As anticipated, when a proportion of patients are considered immune, the number of infections
in each strategy decreases. The ICER for strategy 25 compared with strategy 22 also increases
(see Appendix 2, Table 23).
TABLE 15 The estimated numbers of patients infected during a hospital stay in strategy 22, strategy 24 and strategy 25
and the efficiency frontier in the sensitivity analyses undertaken (continued )
Sensitivity analysis
Number of patients infected













Changing the failure rates of laboratory-based
SARS-CoV-2 tests to 2.5%
182.94 184.44 158.26 – Extendedly
dominated
51,762
Assuming that test failures are to be taken as a
negative SARS-CoV-2 test
185.92 182.54 163.44 – Extendedly
dominated
43,444
Assuming a longer time before a patient infected
with SARS-CoV-2 is non-infectious
167.96 181.36 148.94 – Dominated 52,366
Assuming the laboratory-based SARS-CoV-2 tests
had a turnaround time of 21.3 hours when
calibrating the model
143.88 144.98 127.22 – Dominated 59,669
Reducing the attack rate of asymptomatic patients
to 0.31 that of symptomatic patients
159.46 157.94 139.20 – Extendedly
dominated
49,187
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Changing the hospital configuration
As stated in The configuration of the hospitals used in the example, the hospital configuration is arbitrary.
Two sensitivity analyses have been performed. The first sensitivity analysis makes all of the non-infinite
bays in Table 6 single-bedded, with the remaining bay an infinite one. The second sensitivity analysis
assumes that there are no single-bedded bays in the waiting bay for patients who have clinical
symptoms suggestive of COVID-19.
With single-bedded bays, the number of infections in hospital reduced, although the ICER for strategy 25
decreased, which may be due to Monte Carlo sampling error (see Appendix 2, Table 24). With single-
bedded bays removed for those with clinical symptoms awaiting allocation to a SARS-CoV-2-infected
bay or a non-SARS-CoV-2-infected bay, the number of infections increased, and the ICER of strategy 25
compared with strategy 22 decreased (see Appendix 2, Table 25).
Changing the number of accident and emergency attendances per day
Two sensitivity analyses were performed: (1) increasing the number of patients from 250 per day
to 350 and (2) reducing the number to 150 per day. The results are shown in Tables 26 and 27,
respectively (see Appendix 2).
As expected, with more patients, there were more infections after admission to hospital and fewer
infections after admission to hospital when fewer patients attended A&E; the costs of testing were
correlated with the number of attendees. The ICER for strategy 25 compared with strategy 22 increased
when more patients were assumed to attend A&E and decreased when fewer patients attended.
Changing the composition of attendances at accident and emergency per day
It is hypothesised that if there is considerable SARS-CoV-2 infection in the population then patients with
more minor injuries may not attend A&E. To explore the impact of this, it was assumed that 50% of
patients who would not be hospitalised and did not have SARS-CoV-2 infection would not turn up at
hospital. This resulted in an estimated 144 attendees per day, of whom 6.11% would have SARS-CoV-2
infection and need hospitalisation, 1.56% would have SARS-CoV-2 infection and not need hospitalisation,
20.83% would not have SARS-CoV-2 infection but would need hospitalisation and 71.51% would not
have SARS-CoV-2 infection and would not need hospitalisation. The times to decision on admission were
reduced in line with fewer patients entering A&E for this sensitivity analysis, being 0.90 hours for those
arriving between midnight and 6 a.m., 1.36 hours for those arriving between 6 a.m. and 6 p.m. and
1.81 hours for those arriving between 6 p.m. and midnight. The results (see Appendix 2, Table 28) in this
scenario were similar to those in the base case.
An additional analysis assumed that the breakdown of patients attending A&E were: SARS-CoV-2
infected needing hospitalisation, 10% (previously 3.5%); SARS-CoV-2 infected not needing hospitalisation,
5% (previously 1.8%); non-SARS-CoV-2 infected needing hospitalisation, 11% (previously 12.0%); and
non-SARS-CoV-2 infected not needing hospitalisation, 74% (previously 82.6%). The increase is arbitrary
but the proportion of people with SARS-CoV-2 infection entering A&E is approaching three times that
in the base case, which was thought to be a big enough difference to be informative should the
proportion of SARS-CoV-2 in the community be higher than that during the initial periods of the pandemic.
These results showed that the ICER for strategy 25 compared with strategy 22 decreased (see Appendix 2,
Table 29). Strategy 24 was no longer dominated by strategy 22 and had an ICER of £377,351 compared
with strategy 22.
Changing the proportion of patients who need hospitalisation who do not have a
SARS-CoV-2 infection but have clinical symptoms suggestive of COVID-19
The prevalence of clinical symptoms indicative of COVID-19 in those patients admitted to hospital details
the calculations and assumptions used to populate the proportion of patients hospitalised who do not
have a SARS-CoV-2 infection but have clinical symptoms suggestive of COVID-19. The value estimated
(28.02%) was increased to 50% to account for the higher prevalence of respiratory illness in the winter
months. The sensitivity analysis uses the 28.02% value.
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When the proportion is reduced, the number of infections within hospital is noticeably reduced,
although it is noted that this parameter is not within the control of decision-makers. The ICER for
strategy 25 was seen to decrease compared with the base case (see Appendix 2, Table 30).
Removing the possibility that staff members were infected in the community
In the base case there was a risk of a staff member being infected in the community of 6 in 10,000
per day (see The characteristics of staff members working in the hospital), which is a potential source of
Monte Carlo sampling error. To explore the possibility of this, the possibility of staff members being
infected in the community was removed.
The numbers of infections after hospital admission decreased for all strategies, with the ICER for
strategy 25 compared with strategy 22 increasing to £53,266 (see Appendix 2, Table 31).
Changing the assumed test failure rate
The failure rate for both laboratory-based SARS-CoV-2 tests and SARS-CoV-2 POCTs was set at
5% in the base case. Sensitivity analyses were undertaken changing the rate to 10% and 1%. In both
sensitivity analyses, the ICER for strategy 25 compared with strategy 22 decreased and strategy 24
was no longer dominated by strategy 22, which suggests Monte Carlo sampling error (see Appendix 2,
Tables 32 and 33). The ICER for strategy 24 compared with strategy 22 was £1.9M (1% failure rate)
and £466,032 (10% failure rate).
A further analysis was conducted assuming that the failure rates were lower with a laboratory-based
SARS-CoV-2 test than with a SARS-CoV-2 POCT, with the failure rate reduced to 2.5% in laboratory-
based tests. This resulted in lower costs in strategy 22, as would be expected with fewer tests conducted,
but also a decrease in QALYs, which may be due to either Monte Carlo sampling error or a reduced risk
of infection in the waiting bays. The ICER for strategy 25 compared with strategy 22 decreased modestly
(see Appendix 2, Table 34).
Changing the assumed sensitivity and specificity of chest imaging
In the base case, values of 56% (sensitivity) and 60% (specificity) were used based on data obtained
from chest X-rays. In the sensitivity analyses we use results for computed tomography of 85% for
sensitivity and 50% for specificity. Chest imaging was used to over-ride negative SARS-CoV-2 test
results if the patient also had clinical symptoms suggestive of COVID-19. The computed tomography
values result in more patients with SARS-CoV-2 infection and clinical symptoms indicating SARS-CoV-2
being correctly allocated after a false-negative SARS-CoV-2 test, but fewer patients without SARS-
CoV-2 infection but symptoms suggestive of COVID-19 being correctly allocated after a true-negative
SARS-CoV-2 test.
The change in the number of infections differed between strategies, being higher in strategy 22 and
strategy 25 (see Appendix 2, Table 35), which is likely to be Monte Carlo sampling error given the
relatively high diagnostic accuracy of these tests (see Table 9), although there were fewer infections
with strategy 24, which had poorer diagnostic accuracy. The ICER for strategy 25 compared with
strategy 22 increased to £51,762; the ICER for strategy 24 compared with strategy 22 was £131,171.
Assuming that all failed SARS-CoV-2 tests would be interpreted as negative results rather
than reperformed
When it was assumed that failed tests would not be identified as such, the testing costs of all
strategies decreased, although the QALYs gained differed, being relatively greater in strategy 24,
which had a lower diagnostic accuracy. The ICER for strategy 25 compared with strategy 22 decreased
(see Appendix 2, Table 36) and strategy 24 was no longer dominated, but had an ICER of £287,733
compared with strategy 22.
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Assuming a longer period of infectiousness
The model was recalibrated for strategy 1 assuming that that the time from becoming infectious to
becoming non-infectious was 12.3 days, using data on time from clinical symptom onset to being non-
infectious (10 days) from Singanayagam et al.13 rather than 7.1 days as used in the base case. The ICER
for strategy 25 compared with strategy 22 increased (see Appendix 2, Table 37).
Assuming that the laboratory-based SARS-CoV-2 test took 21.3 hours
The model was recalibrated for strategy 1 assuming that the time to obtain a result from the
laboratory-based SARS-CoV-2 test was 21.3 hours from Clark et al.,40 rather than 35.9 hours. The ICER
for strategy 25 compared with strategy 22 increased (see Appendix 2, Table 38).
Assuming a lower attack rate associated with asymptomatic SARS-CoV-2 infection
In the base-case model it was assumed that the probability of an asymptomatic patient infecting a
susceptible person would be 31% lower, based on the considerable uncertainty in this parameter, the wide
range in this value for a recent study from Imperial College London,22 which included a sensitivity analysis
of no reduction, and SCM input. In a sensitivity analysis we have set the reduction to 61% in line with data
from Koh et al.21 The model was recalibrated for strategy 1 assuming a reduction of 61%. The ICER for
strategy 25 compared with strategy 22 increased (see Appendix 2, Table 39), although strategy 24 was no
longer dominated by strategy 22 and had an ICER of £647,720 compared with strategy 22.
Sensitivity analyses on the turnaround time of SARS-CoV-2 tests applied to
strategy 2 and strategy 14
Additional sensitivity analyses were undertaken specifically changing the time to test result for
strategies 2 and 14. These represent laboratory-based SARS-CoV-2 tests and SARS-CoV-2 POCTs
using data on diagnostic accuracy from currently available SARS-CoV-2 POCTs. The turnaround times
evaluated, along with the estimated number of infections associated with each time, are shown in
Table 16. The rationale for the analysis is that the time to get a laboratory-based SARS-CoV-2 test
result will differ markedly across hospitals; POCTs are likely to have uncertain queueing times.
A slight Monte Carlo sampling error is seen in the reduction in the estimated number of infections
after hospital admittance when the turnaround time of the SARS-CoV-2 POCT was increased from
30 minutes to 1 hour.
The number of infections was used to estimate QALY losses, with the costs of testing coming from the
model. It should be noted that these costs are lower than for strategies 22, 24 and 25 because of the
lack of testing of asymptomatic patients.
TABLE 16 Number of infections associated with different turnaround times for strategy 2 and strategy 14
Laboratory-based SARS-CoV-2 test SARS-CoV-2 POCT
Turnaround time (hours) Number of infections Turnaround time (hours) Number of infections
4 175 0.5 177
6 (strategy 12) 188 1 175
12 209 2 182
16 221 3.8 (strategy 14) 192
24 (strategy 11) 227 6 197
35.9 (strategy 2) 230 8 (strategy 15) 207
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A plot of the estimated testing costs of each strategy and the QALY losses subtracted from 50 for
different turnaround times is provided in Figure 16. Test costs are lower in scenarios when the
turnaround time is longer, as a higher proportion of patients would be discharged (or would have died)
prior to retesting in non-SARS-CoV-2-infected bays.
The ICER for each pairwise comparison of laboratory-based SARS-CoV-2 tests and SARS-CoV-2 POCTs is
provided in Table 17. It can be seen that the cost-effectiveness of SARS-CoV-2 POCTs reduces as the
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FIGURE 16 The estimated testing costs and QALY gains of each strategy under different assumptions related to
turnaround times. Legend represents type of test (L, laboratory based; P, POCT) and time in hours to get the result.
TABLE 17 Pairwise comparison ICERs for laboratory-based SARS-CoV-2 tests and SARS-CoV-2 POCTs
Turnaround time for SARS-CoV-2 POCT (hours)




4 Dominated Dominated Dominated Dominated Dominated Dominated
6 £58,257 £48,545 £96,601 Dominated Dominated Dominated
12 £21,331 £19,869 £24,288 £38,441 £55,315 £291,517
16 £16,152 £15,306 £17,616 £23,499 £28,601 £45,541
24 £15,365 £14,643 £16,565 £21,166 £24,874 £35,127
35.9 £15,750 £15,057 £16,905 £21,202 £24,544 £33,201
ICERs are for SARS-CoV-2 POCTs compared with laboratory-based SARS-CoV-2 tests.
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Sensitivity analyses exploring the impact of no testing
Sensitivity analyses were undertaken exploring the results in the situation that it was not possible
to undertake SARS-CoV-2 testing. Two strategies were tested, denoted strategy 31 and strategy 32.
In strategy 31 patients were assumed to be allocated to bays based on clinical symptoms alone, whereas
in strategy 32 patients were allocated to SARS-CoV-2-infected bays if they had clinical symptoms and
chest imaging results suggestive of COVID-19, with all other patients going to non-SARS-CoV-2-infected
bays. These strategies have more infections than those detailed in Tables 11 and 12, with 284 infections
for strategy 31 and 293 infections for strategy 32. However, these strategies would not incur the costs
of SARS-CoV-2 testing and would also not necessitate waiting before test results were known. Figure 17
provides the NMB at different thresholds of willingness to pay per QALY for strategies 31 and 32,
and other relevant strategies: strategy 3 (a SARS-CoV-2 POCTwith the desirable TPP), strategy 11
(a laboratory-based SARS-CoV-2 test with a turnaround time of 24 hours), strategy 13 (a SARS-CoV-2
POCTwith the acceptable TPP) and strategy 14 (using data from currently available SARS-CoV-2
POCTs). All strategies are compared with strategy 1, the strategy assumed to be in place at the
start of the pandemic.
It is seen that, at low willingness-to-pay values (≤ £30,000 per QALY), no testing appears to be one
of the options with the highest NMB values, owing to the high costs associated with testing. As the
willingness-to-pay threshold increases to £50,000 per QALY, these strategies compare unfavourably
with other strategies. This indicates that the cost of SARS-CoV-2 tests is, as expected, a key driver of


























FIGURE 17 The estimated NMB of selected strategies assuming two no-testing strategies.
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Chapter 3 Discussion and conclusions
The EAG has constructed a mathematical model to simulate the spread of SARS-CoV-2 infectionamong patients admitted to hospital following attendance at A&E. This was developed with SCM
input and other expert clinical advice. The model was populated using the best data identified, and the
model was calibrated in an attempt to try to obtain plausible parameters where data were unknown;
however, there is considerable uncertainty in parameter population estimates. Sensitivity analyses
have been conducted to provide insight into the impact of uncertain parameter values. As a result,
the model results should be viewed with caution and be taken as indicative rather than definitive,
as a degree of Monte Carlo sampling error also remains. However, given that the reduction in sampling
error will be correlated with the square root of the number of random number streams, considerably
more computational time would be required to provide markedly more precise answers, which was not
possible within the time scales of this work. When more data are available for the characteristics of both
non-hypothetical SARS-CoV-2 POCTs and laboratory-based SARS-CoV-2, these specific strategies
should be run using a greater number of random number streams to reduce Monte Carlo sampling error.
Full incremental analyses have been undertaken, although these are of limited value if the strategies
evaluated are not realistic. For example, at the time of writing, it is uncertain if a SARS-CoV-2 POCT
that meets the desirable, or even acceptable, TPPs will be available in the near future. If results from
SARS-CoV-2 POCTs cannot be turned around in a timely manner when used in a hospital, then the
results for SARS-CoV-2 POCTs in this report are redundant.
Analyses using data from currently available SARS-CoV-2 POCTs have been undertaken, and although
these tests do not meet the turnaround time required for an acceptable TPP, simulated results using
the data from currently available SARS-CoV-2 POCTs appear to produce fewer infections than the
acceptable TPP even with longer turnaround times than reported. The currently available SARS-CoV-2
POCTs would fail to meet the criterion of turnaround time to have an acceptable TPP.
If a SARS-CoV-2 POCTwith a desirable TPP exists, it appears to have a relatively high NMB, although
this may be lower than that of a laboratory-based test that has a turnaround time of 6 hours, depending
on the cost-per-QALY threshold (see Figure 12, strategy 3, for a SARS-CoV-2 POCTwith a desirable TPP,
and strategy 12 for a laboratory-based POCTwith a turnaround time of 6 hours). If the SARS-CoV-2
POCT has the acceptable TPP, then it appears to have a lower NMB than a SARS-CoV-2 laboratory-
based test with a 24-hour turnaround time (see Figure 12, strategy 13, for a SARS-CoV-2 POCTwith an
acceptable TPP, and strategy 11 for a laboratory-based POCTwith a turnaround time of 24 hours).
It appears that strategies involving SARS-CoV-2 testing of asymptomatic staff and removing these
staff members from duty reduces the number of infections and is associated with higher NMBs than
strategies that do not test asymptomatic staff, at higher willingness-to-pay levels but not at lower
levels [see Figure 12: comparing strategies 1–5 (no staff testing) with strategies 6–10 (testing of
asymptomatic staff)].
However, cost-effectiveness is only one dimension of the decision problem, as it may not be logistically
possible to keep patients in a waiting bay until the laboratory-based SARS-CoV-2 test returns a result,
particularly if this turnaround time approaches 36 hours. Analyses of the occupancy levels of the
waiting bays (see Figure 4, and Appendix 1, Figures 18 and 19) showed that quicker SARS-CoV-2 POCTs
reduce the numbers of patients in waiting bays considerably, which may have benefits beyond those
purely related to COVID-19.
The model has limitations in that it did not consider patients entering hospital through routes other than
A&E, the implications of patients with respiratory diseases such as pneumonia catching SARS-CoV-2,
testing at discharge following a hospital stay and the costs associated should hospital wards need to be
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closed following an outbreak. If these aspects were to be considered it is likely that the ICERs for
SARS-CoV-2 tests with better diagnostic accuracy would become more favourable. There is considerable
uncertainty in parameter values associated with key variables and a small degree of Monte Carlo sampling
error remains in the results, indicating that more random number streams would need to be run to give
more accurate results. Additionally, simplifications have been made regarding the use of POCTs, including
not having designated staff for this procedure, and in not explicitly incorporating batching of patients’
tests where appropriate. Nevertheless, broad conclusions can be drawn from the results presented, and
intuitively these have face validity. For example, improvements in diagnostic accuracy reduced the number
of infections, and reductions in the turnaround times of tests were associated with smaller numbers
of infections and less time spent in waiting bays prior to allocation to a SARS-CoV-2-infected or a
non-SARS-CoV-2-infected bay.
Considerable uncertainty remains about the parameters used to populate the model, including the
time from requesting a SARS-CoV-2 test to obtaining the result, whether through a POCT or a
laboratory-based approach; the diagnostic accuracy of SARS-CoV-2 POCTs compared with laboratory-
based tests; the occupancy levels of waiting bays and isolation rooms; and the impact on quality of
life after COVID-19 that requires treatment in the ICU. Further research on these parameters appears
worthwhile. Establishing the costs of SARS-CoV-2 POCTs is also important in determining their
cost-effectiveness.
In conclusion, given the heterogeneity of hospitals, no blanket solution can be provided. This report
contains information that should be useful for decision-makers in assessing their own specific
problem. In addition, the modelling structure developed is anticipated to be useful in assessing the
cost-effectiveness of SARS-CoV-2 POCTs as further information on the costs, turnaround times and
diagnostic accuracy of these becomes known.
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Appendix 1 Results relating to occupancy
levels in waiting bays while a decision to
allocate to a SARS-CoV-2-infected bay or a
non-SARS-CoV-2-infected bay is being made
F igure 18 shows the occupancy of the infinite bay under the different strategies for people whohave clinical symptoms suggestive of COVID-19. When a timely SARS-CoV-2 test is used, the
infinite bay may not be required, and the highest numbered used bay occupancy is shown instead.
For example, in strategy 3, instead of a ninth bay being used, only three bays are used. Figure 19 shows
the occupancy of the infinite bay under the different strategies for people who do not have clinical
symptoms suggestive of COVID-19.
As in most strategies where patients with symptoms of COVID-19 are retested if the result of their
first SARS-CoV-2 test is negative, the occupancy level is proportionately higher in the waiting bay for
those with clinical symptoms suggestive of COVID-19 than in the waiting bay for those without clinical













































FIGURE 18 Occupancy levels in the infinite bay (bay 9), unless stated otherwise, for patients with symptoms suggestive of
COVID-19 waiting to be allocated to a SARS-CoV-2-infected or a non-SARS-CoV-2-infected bay for each strategy. (a) S2;
(b) S3 – bay 3; (c) S4 – bay 3; (d) S5; (e) S6; (f) S7; (g) S8 – bay 3; (h) S9 – bay 3; (i) S10; (j) S11; (k) S12; (l) S13 – bay 5;
(m) S14 – bay 6; (n) S15; (o) S16 – bay 5; (p) S17 – bay 4; (q) S18; (r) S19; (s) S20; (t) S21 – bay 6; (u) S22; (v) S23;
(w) S24 – bay 5; (x) S25 – bay 6; (y) S26; (z) S27 – bay 5; (aa) S28 – bay 6; (ab) S29; and (ac) S30 – bay 7. S, strategy. (continued )
DOI: 10.3310/hta25210 Health Technology Assessment 2021 Vol. 25 No. 21
Copyright © 2021 Stevenson et al. This work was produced by Stevenson et al. under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for Health and
Social Care. This is an Open Access publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution CC BY 4.0 licence, which permits unrestricted use,
distribution, reproduction and adaption in any medium and for any purpose provided that it is properly attributed. See: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.

























































































FIGURE 18 Occupancy levels in the infinite bay (bay 9), unless stated otherwise, for patients with symptoms suggestive of
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(b) S3 – bay 3; (c) S4 – bay 3; (d) S5; (e) S6; (f) S7; (g) S8 – bay 3; (h) S9 – bay 3; (i) S10; (j) S11; (k) S12; (l) S13 – bay 5;
(m) S14 – bay 6; (n) S15; (o) S16 – bay 5; (p) S17 – bay 4; (q) S18; (r) S19; (s) S20; (t) S21 – bay 6; (u) S22; (v) S23;
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(b) S3 – bay 3; (c) S4 – bay 3; (d) S5; (e) S6; (f) S7; (g) S8 – bay 3; (h) S9 – bay 3; (i) S10; (j) S11; (k) S12; (l) S13 – bay 5;
(m) S14 – bay 6; (n) S15; (o) S16 – bay 5; (p) S17 – bay 4; (q) S18; (r) S19; (s) S20; (t) S21 – bay 6; (u) S22; (v) S23;
(w) S24 – bay 5; (x) S25 – bay 6; (y) S26; (z) S27 – bay 5; (aa) S28 – bay 6; (ab) S29; and (ac) S30 – bay 7. S, strategy. (continued )
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FIGURE 19 Occupancy levels in the infinite bay (bay 7), unless stated otherwise, for patients without symptoms suggestive
of COVID-19 waiting to be allocated to a SARS-CoV-2-infected or a non-SARS-CoV-2-infected bay for each strategy.
(a) S2; (b) S3 – bay 1; (c) S4 – bay 1; (d) S5; (e) S6; (f) S7; (g) S8 – bay 1; (h) S9 – bay 1; (i) S10; (j) S11; (k) S12; (l) S13 – bay 1;
(m) S14 – bay 2; (n) S14 – bay 3; (o) S16 – bay 1; (p) S17 – bay 2; (q) S18; (r) S19 – bay 3; (s) S20; (t) S21 – bay 3; (u) S22;
(v) S23 – bay 3; (w) S24 – bay 1; (x) S25 – bay 2; (y) S26 – bay 3; (z) S27 – bay 1; (aa) S28 – bay 2; (ab) S29; and (ac) S30 –
bay 3. S, strategy. (continued )
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FIGURE 19 Occupancy levels in the infinite bay (bay 7), unless stated otherwise, for patients without symptoms suggestive
of COVID-19 waiting to be allocated to a SARS-CoV-2-infected or a non-SARS-CoV-2-infected bay for each strategy.
(a) S2; (b) S3 – bay 1; (c) S4 – bay 1; (d) S5; (e) S6; (f) S7; (g) S8 – bay 1; (h) S9 – bay 1; (i) S10; (j) S11; (k) S12; (l) S13 – bay 1;
(m) S14 – bay 2; (n) S14 – bay 3; (o) S16 – bay 1; (p) S17 – bay 2; (q) S18; (r) S19 – bay 3; (s) S20; (t) S21 – bay 3; (u) S22;
(v) S23 – bay 3; (w) S24 – bay 1; (x) S25 – bay 2; (y) S26 – bay 3; (z) S27 – bay 1; (aa) S28 – bay 2; (ab) S29; and (ac) S30 –
bay 3. S, strategy.
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Appendix 2 Supplementary results
TABLE 18 Assuming that clinicians do not over-ride a negative SARS-CoV-2 test
Strategy Testing cost (£) 50 –QALYs lost Efficiency frontier (ICER) (£)
22 221,143 42.84 –
24 294,951 41.65 Dominated
25 295,959 45.16 32,177
TABLE 19 Halving the product of attack rates and effective contacts
Strategy Testing cost (£) 50 –QALYs lost Efficiency frontier (ICER) (£)
22 213,917 46.07 –
24 281,122 45.66 Dominated
25 282,088 46.81 91,984
TABLE 20 Doubling the product of attack rates and effective contacts
Strategy Testing cost (£) 50 –QALYs lost Efficiency frontier (ICER) (£)
22 211,515 21.07 –
24 280,158 23.93 Extendedly dominated
25 280,607 25.72 14,845
TABLE 21 Allowing the use of pink bays
Strategy Testing cost (£) 50 –QALYs lost Efficiency frontier (ICER) (£)
22 220,558 38.57 –
24 290,257 39.11 Extendedly dominated
25 291,110 40.76 32,250
TABLE 22 Allowing patients with two negative SARS-CoV-2 tests but with clinical symptoms to remain in the waiting
bay until death, discharge or ICU care
Strategy Testing cost (£) 50 –QALYs lost Efficiency frontier (ICER) (£)
22 204,990 38.87 –
24 263,082 39.08 Extendedly dominated
25 264,779 40.38 39,746
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TABLE 23 Assuming that 10% of patients and staff without SARS-CoV-2 infection are immune
Strategy Testing cost (£) 50 –QALYs lost Efficiency frontier (ICER) (£)
22 213,408 40.71 –
24 281,097 40.16 Dominated
25 281,841 42.04 51,256
TABLE 24 Assuming all single-bedded bays apart from the infinite bay
Strategy Testing cost (£) 50 –QALYs lost Efficiency frontier (ICER) (£)
22 212,529 40.45 –
24 280,208 40.28 Dominated
25 280,806 42.19 39,254
TABLE 25 Assuming no single-bedded bays for those waiting for the results of a SARS-CoV-2 test who have clinical
symptoms suggestive of COVID-19
Strategy Testing cost (£) 50 –QALYs lost Efficiency frontier (ICER) (£)
22 213,007 38.44 –
24 280,903 38.26 Dominated
25 281,597 40.52 33,036
TABLE 26 Assuming that 350 patients per day attend A&E
Strategy Testing cost (£) 50 –QALYs lost Efficiency frontier (ICER) (£)
22 271,674 35.16 –
24 359,455 34.69 Dominated
25 360,235 36.81 53,808
TABLE 27 Assuming that 150 patients per day attend A&E
Strategy Testing cost (£) 50 –QALYs lost Efficiency frontier (ICER) (£)
22 155,075 42.94 –
24 203,350 42.74 Dominated
25 203,766 44.51 30,927
APPENDIX 2
NIHR Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
64
TABLE 29 Assuming that a higher proportion of patients attending A&E have SARS-CoV-2 infection
Strategy Testing cost (£) 50 –QALYs lost Efficiency frontier (ICER) (£)
22 238,605 34.29 –
24 322,141 34.52 Extendedly dominated
25 315,541 37.39 24,879
TABLE 30 Assuming that a lower proportion of people without SARS-CoV-2 infection have clinical symptoms suggestive
of COVID-19
Strategy Testing cost (£) 50 –QALYs lost Efficiency frontier (ICER) (£)
22 202,230 41.26 –
24 267,337 40.75 Dominated
25 267,699 43.25 32,769
TABLE 31 Assuming that no staff members are infected in the community
Strategy Testing cost (£) 50 –QALYs lost Efficiency frontier (ICER) (£)
22 213,197 39.08 –
24 280,861 39.01 Dominated
25 281,604 40.37 53,266
TABLE 32 Assuming a 1% SARS-CoV-2 test failure rate
Strategy Testing cost (£) 50 –QALYs lost Efficiency frontier (ICER) (£)
22 208,846 39.31 –
24 274,970 39.34 Extendedly dominated
25 275,911 41.15 36,507
TABLE 28 Allowing a reduction in the proportion of people attending A&E who do not need hospital admittance
Strategy Testing cost (£) 50 –QALYs lost Efficiency frontier (ICER) (£)
22 213,042 38.74 –
24 280,610 38.72 Dominated
25 281,403 40.31 43,459
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TABLE 33 Assuming a 10% SARS-CoV-2 test failure rate
Strategy Testing cost (£) 50 –QALYs lost Efficiency frontier (ICER) (£)
22 218,703 38.34 –
24 289,190 38.49 Extendedly dominated
25 289,718 40.71 30,010
TABLE 34 Assuming a lower test failure rate for laboratory-based SARS-CoV-2 tests (2.5%) than for SARS-CoV-2
POCTs (5%)
Strategy Testing cost (£) 50 –QALYs lost Efficiency frontier (ICER) (£)
22 210,496 38.82 –
24 280,828 38.72 Dominated
25 281,597 40.52 41,904
TABLE 35 Assuming that the diagnostic accuracy of chest imaging in detecting COVID-19 is taken from computed
tomography
Strategy Testing cost (£) 50 –QALYs lost Efficiency frontier (ICER) (£)
22 211,103 38.91 –
24 277,476 39.42 Extendedly dominated
25 278,147 40.21 51,762
TABLE 36 Assuming that all failed SARS-CoV-2 tests would be interpreted as negative results for SARS-CoV-2 infection
Strategy Testing cost (£) 50 –QALYs lost Efficiency frontier (ICER) (£)
22 209,090 38.62 –
24 275,952 38.85 Extendedly dominated
25 276,234 40.16 43,444
TABLE 37 Assuming a longer time to becoming non-infectious
Strategy Testing cost (£) 50 –QALYs lost Efficiency frontier (ICER) (£)
22 213,267 39.85 –
24 280,920 38.93 Dominated
25 281,741 41.16 52,366
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TABLE 38 Assuming that laboratory-based SARS-CoV-2 tests have a turnaround time of 21.3 hours
Strategy Testing cost (£) 50 –QALYs lost Efficiency frontier (ICER) (£)
22 213,385 41.51 –
24 280,935 41.43 Dominated
25 281,728 42.65 59,669
TABLE 39 Assuming a lower attack rate associated with asymptomatic SARS-CoV-2 infection
Strategy Testing cost (£) 50 –QALYs lost Efficiency frontier (ICER) (£)
22 213,069 40.44 –
24 280,756 40.54 Extendedly dominated
25 281,581 41.83 49,187
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